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W/right Line, 4 Division of Wright
Line, Inc., The Right Answer to the

Wrong Question: A Review of Its
Impact to Date

KATHLEEN M. KELLY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)' states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "encourage or discourage" union activities "by discrimination" regarding terms of employment.2 Classically, alleged violations of section 8(a)(3) contest the propriety of a discharge or other
adverse action that the employer asserts to have been caused by some
motive other than an intent to discourage union activity. In Wright
Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,3 the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") adopted a new statement
of the analysis to be applied in testing employer motive for adverse
action.' The Board justified this new statement as (1) more likely to
* B.A., 1973 Yale University; J.D. 1976 George Washington University and Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California. Partner, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy.
1. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1976).
2. The text of §8(a)(3) reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
3. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
4. Within Wright Line itself, the Board stated that the formulation announced therein
would subsequently be applicable to "all cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(3) or violations of
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accommodate all litigants' legitimate interests, and (2) necessary to "alleviate intolerable confusion in the 8(a)(3) area"' brought about by
conflict between the Board and some circuit courts of appeal.
Both labor and management have engaged in significant speculation

as to what, if any, impact Wright Line will have upon the outcome in
unfair labor practice (hereinafter referred to as ULP) cases. After discussing the historical developments leading up to Wright Line, this article analyzes those decisions in which Wright Line was applied in the
eighteen months following its issuance6 for the purpose of: (1) deter-

mining precisely what impact this new formation has had upon the outcome of ULP cases; and (2) measuring Wright Line's success in
achieving the two objectives summarized above.

Wright Line is found to have fallen short of both its goals because the
Board moved too hurriedly towards the statement of a rule which appeared capable of embracing both the Board's own prior standard and
competing standards offered by the courts of appeals. Before grasping
for uniformity, the Board should have analyzed more exhaustively the
competing interests which produced differing formulations in this area
and taken more care to assure adequate protection of those interests
under its new statement. Upon abandoning its own prior formulation,
the Board abandoned important interests sought to be served by the
Act which could have been better identified and protected within the
section 8(a)(1) turning on employer motivation" 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. See infra text accompanying notes 7-16 for a discussion of distinctions between cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(3)
and cases alleging independent violation of section 8(a)(l). Since its promulgation, the rules
stated in Wright Line have also been applied to cases alleging adverse union action in violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act (29 U.S.C. §168(b)(1)(A) (1976)) (United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 1105, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (1981)), and cases alleging adverse union action violative of section 8(b)(2) of the Act (29 U.S.C. §158(b)(2) (1976)) (Freight,
Construction, General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 287 IBT, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 168
(1981)). On two occasions, the Board has declined to decide whether the Wright Line standards
should be applicable to cases alleging employer violation of section 8(a)(4) of the Act (29 U.S.C.
§158(a)(4) (1976)), which proscribes discrimination because an employee "has filed charges or
given testimony under th[e] Act." See American Interstate Freight Lines, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 131
(1980); Royal Development Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1981). In two other contemporaneous
cases, a majority of the Board panel has applied the Wright Line standards to cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(4). See Haynes-Trane Serv. Agency, 259 N.L.R.B. No. 12, slip. op. at 2, n.2
(1981) (Members Fanning and Zimmerman applying Wright Line and Member Jenkins finding it
inapplicable); Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local No. 420, IBT, 257 N.L.R.B. No.
161, slip op. at 2, n.2 (1981) (Members Fanning, Jenkins and Zimmerman applying Wright Line
without comment).
5. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
6. The cases studied in order to determine Wright Line'r impact included the first 169 cases
published by the Board which discuss the Wright Line formulation or apply it to particular facts.
Those cases begin with Behring Int'l, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 354 (1980) and conclude with Stop and
Shop Co., Medi Mart Div., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981). They are believed to encompass all
published cases of the type under study reflecting decisions rendered by the Board through December 31, 1981. The decisions under study discuss approximately 226 separate factual situations
alleged to have violated sections 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(l). In arriving at this figure allegations regarding
separate alleged discriminatees which arise out of the same factual circumstances have been
grouped together.
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Wright Line framework. This article suggests certain modifications
and additions to the Wright Line approach designed to accomplish
these ends.

II.
A.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING

UP To

WRIGHT LINE

Nature of the Cases in Which Motive Has Proved to Be a
ProblematicIssue

In order to trace the background which leads to Wright Line, it is
first necessary to distinguish between two types of unfair labor practice
cases in which employer motive for adverse action becomes relevant.7
for
As noted above, section 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibits discrimination
the purpose of discouraging union activity. These terms obviously
raise two topics of inquiry where adverse employer action is claimed to
violate section 8(a)(3). First, discrimination must be shown and second, an intent to discourage union activities must be shown.
As to the first issue, discrimination, counsel for the General Counsel
(hereinafter referred to as General Counsel) generally begins by establishing that the alleged discriminatee (hereinafter referred to as AD)
was selected for adverse action. General Counsel then seeks to satisfy
the second element of a section 8(a)(3) violation, intent to discourage
union activity, by showing: (1) union activity on the AD's part;
(2) knowledge of that activity by the employer; and (3) union animus
on the employer's part warranting an inference of a desire to discourage union activity.'
The employer generally responds by urging selection of the AD for
adverse action to have resulted from uniform application of business
policies. This raises an issue regarding the cause for the adverse employer action: Was it caused by the AD's union activity or by the proffered legitimate business reason? Where this issue of cause is resolved
against the employer, the second element of a Section 8(a)(3) violation,
an intent to discourage union activity, is generally inferred. As stated
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
[Tihe trier of facts may infer motive from the total circumstances
proved. Otherwise no person accused of unlawful motive who took
the stand and testified to a lawful motive could be brought to
If he finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false,
book ....
he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that,
7. Although the distinction drawn in the text is rudimentary, it is worth drawing carefully.
As will be discussed in infra text accompanying notes 99-102, the Board and the courts have not
consistently borne this rudimentary distinction in mind and this error has sometimes produced
unsatisfactory analysis.
8. See Gonic Mfg. Co., Div. of Hampshire Willen Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 201, 209 (1963).
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he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where, as in this case, the sur9
rounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act bars any employer conduct which interferes with, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of rights protected by the Act.' 0 The Board has long recognized that violation of
any other subpart within section 8(a) has some effect prohibited by section 8(a)(l). 1" Where a violation of section 8(a)(3) is alleged, therefore,
a "derivative" violation of section 8(a)(1) is also alleged.
A termination or other adverse employment action may also be independently violative of section 8(a)(1), however, even when the elements

of a section 8(a)(3) violation are absent. This generally occurs when a
uniform application of business policies causes an employee to be disciplined as the direct result of protected activity.12 Discrimination, a necessary element of any section 8(a)(3) violation, is absent. A coercive
effect proscribed by section 8(a)(1), however, is quite present.
The following example illustrates well this category of case. The
Board has long held an employee's expression of dissent in grievance
meetings to be a protected activity.13 An employee can exceed the
scope of that protection, however, through expression of dissent in an
outrageous fashion.14 On occasion, employers discipline employees for
use of vulgarities or defiant speech in grievance meetings. Such discipline might be justified as strictly in keeping with uniform rules calling
9. Shattuck Dena Mining Corp. (Iron King Branch) v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
1966).
10. Section 8(a)(1) provides that, "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."
11. 3 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 52 (1939).
12. Terminations have been found independently violative of section 8(a)(l) under two other
circumstances not described in the text. The Board has found, with Supreme Court approval, that
an independent section 8(a)(1) violation has occurred requiring reinstatement in circumstances
when the employee subject to discipline is deprived of the right to union representation during an
investigatory interview preceding discipline. NLRB v. J. Winegarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 271 (1975);
Tara Corp. Indus., A Division of Tara Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1981); Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1980), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982). The
Board has also found that termination of a supervisor, unprotected by the Act, may bring about an
independent violation of section 8(a)(l) requiring reinstatement if implemented as part of a
"widespread pattern of misconduct" and effectuated in a manner suggesting to protected employees that they will be dealt with similarly should they engage in union activities. See, e.g., Brothers
Three Cabinets, 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980). Recent appointments to the Board produced abandonment of the Brothers Three Cabinets rationale in Parker-Robb Chevrolet, 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58
(1982). Cases developing the principles stated in Winegarten and BrothersThree Cabinets are not
discussed in the main body of this article since they do not generally pose motivation issues of the
sort dealt with in Wright Line.
13. See, e.g., Hawaiian Hauling Service, Ltd., 219 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975); Prescot Indus. Prod.
Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 51 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Successful Creations, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 242 (1973); Charles Myers & Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 448 (1971).
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for given discipline upon use of particular words in the work place. If

so, discrimination would not be present.
Despite this fact, the Board might find that the conduct at issue was

not sufficiently outrageous to remove the employee involved from the
Act's protections. 5 If so, the discipline would independently violate
section 8(a)(1) by coercing the employee to refrain from further exer-

cise of this protected activity.
Issues of motive also arise in cases involving independent violations

of section 8(a)(1). Frequently, the employer argues that some conduct
other than that claimed to have been protected was actually the moving
force producing discipline. 6 When such a claim is made, the question

of cause must be resolved just as it typically is in Section 8(a)(3) cases.
B.

The Controversy That Preceded Wright Line
Prior to Wright Line, the Board carried on two struggles with the

courts of appeals in section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1) cases necessitat-

ing an inquiry into motive. Many cases reflected differing approaches
by the Board and the courts as to the weight that should be afforded

competing evidence of motive. Additionally, significant controversy
existed regarding the legal rule which should obtain where review of all
the evidence convinces the trier of fact that at least two causes, one

legitimate and one illegitimate, played a role in producing the employer action at issue. Such "dual motive" cases raised the question:
Does the mere presence of improper motive establish an unfair labor
practice or does the law require a showing that the improper motive

played some form of significant role in producing the employer action
at issue?
15. See, e.g., Bob Henry Dodge, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 78 (1973).
16. If the employer seeks to establish misconduct allegedly occurring during the course of
protected activity as the "legitimate" cause for discipline, no issue of motive is posed. This principle was established in NLRB v. Burup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). In that case, the emplo.er discharged two employees believed to have made threats against the employer's property
whie advocating union organization to co-workers. The charge of threats was disproven. Thereafter, the employer sought to defend against the claim that its action violated section 8(a)(1)
though asserting that it had been motivated by a good faith belief that misconduct had occurred.
The Court found the employer's claim of good faith motivation irrelevant i this context because
the
interrelationship
between by
thesection
asserted
grounds
discharge
and protected
"deterrent
activity
effect" prohibited
rendered
8(a)(l)
quiteforlikely.
379 U.S.
at 23. It may
be said,
there-a
fore, that with regard to disciplinary actions of the sort dealt with in this article, motive is only
relevant to independent section 8(a)(1)
eases
when the employer argues that some conduct unrelated to protected activity was actually the moving force producing discipline. The Board and the
courts have not developed a uniform view concerning all circumstances under which motive is
relevant to other types of alleged section 8(a)() violations. For further discussion of this problem,
see Christianson & Svanoe, Motive And Intent In The Commission O/ UnfairLaborracticer:The
Supreme Court Arnd The Fictive F
orality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Oberer, The Scienter Factor
In Section
And (3) 0/The
8a)(J)
Labor Act: 0/ealancingHostile Motives, Dogs And Tails, 52
CORuNELL L.Q. 491 (1967).
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Prior to Wright Line, the Board generally found the presence of improper motive sufficient to establish an unfair labor practice. 7 This
approach was referenced as the "in part" test since a finding that a
discharge was motivated "in part" by an improper motive produced a
further finding that an unfair labor practice had been committed. The
courts of appeals, on the other hand, took a wide range of approaches
upon answering this question which can be placed into six categories.
A minority of appellate decisions adopted the Board's "in part" test.
Several Sixth Circuit decisions applied the "in part" test in cases involving independent violations of section 8(a)(1)."8 The Sixth Circuit
insisted, however, upon the use of different tests in cases involving alleged violations of section 8(a)(3). None of the Sixth Circuit's decisions, however, contained any analysis explaining a logical basis for
distinction between the motive test to be applied in independent section
8(a)(1) cases and section 8(a)(3) cases. 9
Decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit also conflicted with one
another. In one year, the District of Columbia Circuit made a decision
applying the "in part" test20 and a further decision holding that the
Board must, "find an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose an illegal one." 2 ' The Tenth
22
Circuit appeared to adopt the Board's "in part" test more uniformly.
A second group of appellate decisions adopted what may most easily
be referred to as the "but for" test. This test required the General
Counsel to prove that the discharge or other adverse employment action at issue would not have occurred "but for" the presence of the
impermissible cause. The Second Circuit 2 and at least some decisions
17. See The Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976).
18. See NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. of Delaware, 651 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1981);
Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Restaurants, 496 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit appears to have also applied this test
in cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(4) of the Act. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees'
Union, Local 876, 570 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 1978).
19. NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. of Delaware, 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981), NLRB v.
Ogle Protection Serv., 375 F.2d 497 (6th Cir.) cer. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967) as authority directly
contrary to the holding in LloydA4. Fry to the effect that, "[iun this Circuit, if a discharge is motivated 'in part' by an employee's protected concerted activities the discharge violates Section
8(a)(l) of the Act." 651 F.2d at 446. In matter of fact, the two cases are not directly to the
contrary. NLRB v. Ogle ProtectionServ., concerned an alleged violation of section 8(a)(3), not an
alleged violation of section 8(a)(l). The failure of the panel in Lloyd,4. Fry to recognize this as a
possible basis for distinction clearly suggests that the circuit has not developed any reasoned basis
for adhering to different modes of analyzing motive in cases alleging independent violation of
section 8(a)(1) and cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(3).
20. Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21. Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. NLRB, 564
F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (Ist Cir.
1981)).
22. M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173 (10th Cir. 1977).
23. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978).
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rendered by the Ninth Circuit 24 appear to use this test. Analytically,
the "but for" test does not require a showing that the impermissible
ground played a greater part in motivating employer action than the
permissible ground;25 it requires only a showing that the impermissible
ground was sufficiently present and momentous to have pushed the employer from the point of inaction to the point of action.
Some courts of appeal rejected use of the "but for" test in light of this
characteristic and searched for some formulation which would not allow the finding of an unfair labor practice under circumstances where
the proper motive played a proportionately greater part in producing
employer action than did the improper motive, even though the latter
might be characterized as a "but for" cause. The Fifth Circuit fell
within this category. In one decision it held that the impermissible
ground must be the "moving cause" for employer action.26 On another
occasion it suggested that the improper motive must be "reasonably
equal" to the proper motive. 27
A further category of appellate decisions went one step past the Fifth
Circuit's "reasonably equal" formulation and produced what became
the majority view among the courts of appeal prior to Wright Line.
These courts found that the improper cause for adverse employer action must be shown to have been the "dominant motive" in cases of
mixed motives. Literally taken, this test requires a greater showing by
the General Counsel than does the "but for" test. As noted above, an
unfair labor practice may be found under the "but for" test even if the
improper motive's part in the employer's decision-making process was
proportionately small, so long as that motive was sufficient to make the
difference between inaction and action. On the other hand, the "dominant motive" test would appear to require a showing that any improper
cause played a proportionately greater part in producing adverse employer action than did contributing proper causes. Interestingly
enough, however, several courts of appeal shifted back and forth between use of the "but for" test and the "dominant motive" test without
recognition of any apparent inconsistency between them.28 The First
Circuit, which was the first to formulate the "dominant motive" test,
made a gradual shift in description transforming its standard into a
24. NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co., 637 F.2d 1359, 1366-69 (9th Cir. 1981); Ad
Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 669, 678 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. See NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33, 38 (2nd Cir. 1981).
26. TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. Compare Lippincott Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 112, 115 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the
"but for" test) with NLRB v. Int'l Medication Systems, Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981);
L'eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); and Western Exterminators Co.
v. NRLB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1977) (all of which apply the "dominant motive" test).
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"but for" test.29 The Sixth Circuit applied the First Circuit's mixed
"dominant motive"/"but for" test rather consistently in cases alleging
violation of section 8(a)(3).3 °
A further group of appellate decisions resorted to recitation of generalities when confronted with dual motive cases rather than adopting
any of the above summarized formulations. The Third Circuit insisted
that the Board must show the impermissible ground to have been the
"real motive" for employer action without explaining what "real"
means in the context of the dual motive case.3 ' Likewise, the Seventh
Circuit found that an unfair labor practice has not occurred unless a
bad motive contributed in a "significant way" to employer action without ever defining what quantum of motivation reaches "significance." 32
A last group of appellate decisions stated the governing rule in such a
way as to deny the very existence of dual motive cases, thereby avoiding the issue. The following statement by the Fourth Circuit typifies
this approach: "But when cause exists, the Board must show an 'affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause
and chose the bad one.' -33 The First Circuit34 and on one occasion, as
noted above, the District of Columbia Circuit, also resorted to this denial that two motives, one good and one bad, can play a real and tangible part in motivating employer action. In sum, ample evidence existed
to substantiate the observation made by the Board in Wright Line that,
"in an area fundamental to the Act, namely, section 8(a)(3), disagreement and controversy are rampant among the various decisionmaking
29. In NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963), the First Circuit defined the "dominant motive" test as requiring the Board to demonstrate that ". . . the

union activity weighed more heavil in the decision to fire.. ." than did any proper motive. This
definition appears in keeping with the literal meaning of the word "dominant." In NLRB v.
Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971), the First Circuit defined "dominant mo-

tive" as ". . . the one that in fact brought about the result." This formulation appears to render
the "dominant motive" test nearly synonomous with the "but for" test. In Coletti's Furniture, Inc.
v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit made quite clear that it viewed the

"dominant motive" test as synonomous with the "but for" test:
And we are somewhat concerned that, while the ALT cited this Circuit's decision in

NLRB v. Fibers nt'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (1st Cir. 1971), in which we held that

there had to be a finding of dominant motive, he found that the discharge was motivated
'in substantial part' by union animus. Only because it is so clear from the decision as a
whole that the ALl in fact found that Loppi would not have been fired but for his union
activities do we accept the Board's findings.
Id at 1293.
30. Charge Card Ass'n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 651 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1981); Propak Corp. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 169 (6th Cir.
1978).
31. NLRB v. Gentithes, 463 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Rubber Rolls, Inc., 338
F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1967).
32. NLRB v. Pfizer, Inc., 629 F.2d 1272, 1275, 1277 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
33. NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
34. NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968).
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bodies."35
36
C. Wright Line' Response To This Disarray

In Wright Line, the Board responded to this disarray by adopting a
test of causality akin to that used by the Supreme Court in Mount

Healthy City School DistrictBoard of Education v. Doyal. 7 Although
Mount Healthy dealt with adverse employer action alleged to violate an
employee's rights under the first amendment to the United States Con-

stitution, rather than a statutory protection, the facts of the case posed a
remarkably clear instance of dual motivation and the Board found the

Supreme Court's approach to this dual motive case a useful model.
The Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education de-

clined to renew Doyars contract for employment as a teacher and
clearly cited two reasons in support of its decision. Doyal was informed by letter that he was found unacceptable for future employment because (1) he had communicated directly with a local radio
station about a controversy between teachers and the administration
over the dress code to be applicable to teachers, and (2) he used ob3
scene gestures to correct students during a cafeteria confrontation. 1

The district court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court had little difficulty in concluding that the first activity
cited by the Board of Education as a basis for denying Doyal further
employment was an activity protected by the first amendment. 39 The
district court, court of appeals and Supreme Court also presumed the
35. 251 NLRB at 1086. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) rendering decisions prior to
Wright Line used a wide range of labels to describe their causation analysis in an effort to satisfy
both the Board's prevailing standard and the various standards which might be applied if their
decisions were ultimately to be scrutinized by a court of appeals. See, e.g., Herman Bros., Inc.,
252 N.L.R.B. 848 (1980) ("chief reason"); Weather Tamer, Inc. & Tuskegee Garment Corp., 253
NLRB 293 (1980) ("substantially, if not solely motivated"); Russ Togs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767
(1980) ("principally" motivated); Sanitas Cura, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1164 (1981) ("a substantial
ground motivating, but perhaps not necessarily sole reason contributing"); Automotive Armature
Co., Inc., 256 NLRB 270 (1981) ("substantially, if not solely motivated"); Mark I Tune-Up Centers, Inc., 256 NLRB 898 (1981) ("prominent reason").
36. This textual summary is not intended to exhaustively describe and scrutinize the
reasoning of Wright Line. It is provided as necessary background for later discussion. Other
articles have been written for the purpose of critically analyzing the rule of law stated in Wright
Line. See, eg., Coleman, Wright Line: A Variation On The Old Shell Game-Wow You See It,
Now You Don't,"40 FED. BAR. NEWS AND J. 208 (1981); Lederer, "WVright Line or Spurtrack?,43
LAB. L.J. 67 (1982); Note, Wright Line: NLRB Adopts The Mount Healthy Test For DualMotive
Discharge Cases Under the LMJA, 32 MERCER L. REv. (1981); Note, DeterminingA StandardOf
Causation For DiscriminatoryDischarges Under Section 8(a)(3) Of The NationalLabor Relations

Act, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 913 (1982). Such is not the purpose of this article. As stated in the
introduction, this article seeks to analyze Wright Line's practical effect in application and its
degree of success in meeting its stated goals, as measured by applications of that formulation to
date.
37. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
38. Id at 283 n.l.
39. Id at 283-85.
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second activity cited by the Board of Education as a basis for its dissatisfaction with Doyal to have been unprotected by any constitutional or
statutory right.4 0 The case posed, therefore, a situation in which two
motives, one impermissible and one permissible, concededly played
some part in motivating adverse action on an employer's part.
The district court directed Doyal's reinstatement on the grounds that
activity protected by the First Amendment played a "substantial part"
in the Board of Education's decision not to renew Doyal's employment. 41 The court of appeals affirmed this result in a brief per curiam
opinion. The Supreme Court rejected this result, expressing concern
that such a rule, "could place an employee in a better position as a
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing. '42 The court found that,
"the constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in
the conduct. '43 The Court remanded the case to the district court finding that it,
[s]hould have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the
protected conduct. 4
In Wright Line, the Board acknowledged the mode of analysis stated
in Mount Healthy to differ from its own prior "in part" test. As stated
by the Board "Mount Healthy represents a rejection of an 'in part' test
which stops with the establishment of aprimafaciecase or at consideration of an improper motive. ' 45 The Board also found the court's
Mount Healthy formulation to differ from the "dominant motive" test
then prevalent among the courts of appeals. The Board characterized
the "dominant motive" test as requiring the General Counsel to rebut
any employer assertion of proper motive "by demonstrating that the
discharge would not have taken place in the absence of the employee's
protected activities." The Board characterized Mount Healthy as requiring the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the action
at issue in the absence of protected activities rather than requiring the
complainant to prove the opposite. 46 In support of this characterization, Wright Line noted the phrase, "whether the Board had shown
40. Id
41. Id at 283.
42. Id at 285.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id
Id at 287.
251 N.L.R.B. at 1087.
Id
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[emphasis added]" in the Mount Healthy holding quoted above and
also placed reliance upon further Court comment in a case rendered
the same day as Mount Healthy, Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.4 7
After discussing brief excerpts from the legislative history of the Act
and excerpts from the Supreme Court's hallmark decision concerning
the relevance of motive to section 8(a)(3) violations in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers,Inc.4 8 the Board concluded that its understanding of the
Court's Mount Healthy analysis is the most appropriate approach for
application in ULP cases turning on employer motivation. It held,
therefore, as follows:
[W]e shall henceforth employ the following causation test in all cases
alleging violation of Section 8(a)(3) or violations of Section 8(a)(1)
turning on employer motivation. First we shall require that the General Counsel make aprimafacie showing sufficient to support the
inference that protected conduct was a "'motivating factor'" in the
employer's decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to
the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of a protected conduct.4 9
Despite its earlier recognition that the Mount Healthy formulation
differs from its own "in part" test, the Board concluded its discussion in
Wright Line by insisting that replacement of the "in part" test should
not be considered a "repudiation of the well-established principles and
concepts which we have applied in the past." The Board insisted that
both tests represent consistent efforts to reach a single goal, namely,
thorough and complete analysis of "the justification presented by the
employer" in cases of this sort. °

III.

THE EFFECT WRIGHT LINE HAS HAD UPON RESOLUTION OF
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CLAIMS

A.

ObservationsRendered To Date

Since Wright Line itself expresses a disinclination on the Board's part
to repudiate "the well-established principles and concepts which [the
Board has] applied in the past,"'" most observers expected the test to
47. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
48. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
49. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. Although the controversy leading up to Wright Line concerned
only a portion of section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1), cases raising motive as an issue, namely,

"dual motive" cases, the Board directed application of its new Wright Line test to all section
8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(l) cases raising motive. Upon so doing, it intimated that uniform analysis
should be sought since the Wright Line test would be expected to produce results identical to the
prior "in part" test when applied to anything other than a dual motive case. Id at 1089 n.13.
50. Id
51. Id
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result in nothing more than new or additional justification for results
which the Board would have reached in any event. Most commentators expressing an opinion to date have characterized Wright Line as a
facelift approach designed to appease the courts of appeals but unlikely
to make any tangible difference in the outcome of cases.5 2 Such com-

mentators have found no significant statistical variance in the General
Counsel's "win rate" before and after Wright Line.
An analysis of all cases in which the Board has applied Wright Line
to Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter referred to as ALJ) decisions

rendered under pre-Wright Line law gives apparent support to these
observations. One would expect these cases to provide a clear indication of the respects, if any, in which Wright Line demands a different

result from that obtaining under prior law. During the period encompassed by this study, the Board applied Wright Line analysis to approximately 23 cases involving approximately 56 ADs in which the ALJ's

analysis was premised upon prior law.5 3 The Board reversed its ALJ in
only three of these cases. None of these reversals, however, appear to

be premised upon application of the Wright Line formulation to facts
considered by the ALJ under the "in part" test. Each reversal appears

to have resulted from a difference of opinion between the Board panel
and the ALJ as to whether the General counsel had adduced probative
evidence establishing aprimafaciecase.5 4 In each of the cases, the ALJ

found insufficient probative evidence supporting a primafacie case.
The ALJs did not, therefore, proceed to apply the "in part" test since
they found no necessity to separate mixed motives. The Board, upon
finding probative evidence of aprimafaciecase, proceeded to apply the
Wright Line test to additional facts found by the ALJ in each case,

ultimately concluding a violation to have been established. These 56
52. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 36, at 209; Lederer, supra note 36, at 80.
53. R.P. Scherer (Southeast) Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. 400 (1981); Am. Tool & Eng'g Co., 257
N.L.R.B. 608 (1981); Mark I Tune-up Centers, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 898 (1981); Automotive Arnature Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 270 (1981); Transp. Management Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. 101 (1981); Bronco
Wine Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 53 (1981); Sanitas Cura, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1164 (1981); Associated Milk
Producers, 255 N.L.R.B. 750 (1981); Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 520 (1981); Clark Manor
Nursing Home Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 455 (1981) (involving 3 AD's); Newport News Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 375 (1981) (involving 2 AD's); Gossen Co., A Division of the United
States Gypsum Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 339 (1981) (involving 6 AD's); Overnight Transp. Co., 254
N.L.R.B. 132 (1981) (involving 16 AD's); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 871 (1980);

United Broadcasting Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 697 (1980); Russ Togs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767 (1980);
Joshua's, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 588 (1980); Weather Tamer, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 293 (1980); Valley
Cabinet & Mfg., Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 98 (1980); The Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1980);
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1980); Herman Bros., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 848 (1980);
Taylor-Dunn Mfg., 252 N.L.R.B. 799 (1980).
54. Bronco Wine Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 53 (1981); Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 254
N.L.R.B. 455 (1981) (regarding AD Fowley); Overnight Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 132 (1981)
(regarding AD Ennix).
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fact situations, therefore, considered alone, reflect no consequential difference under the Wright Line formulation and prior law.
Neither comparison of the General Counsel's pre-Wright Line and
post-Wright Line "win rates" nor review of post-Wright Line Board
cases reviewing pre-Wright Line ALJ decisions are, however, satisfactory means of testing Wright Line's impact for a very simple reason.
The Board stated in Wright Line that the holding of that case would be
applicable in the future to all cases involving employer motive. The
Board further made clear, however, that the new rule was designed primarily to deal with a specific category of case which had previously
been surrounded by controversy, namely, dual motive cases. The
Board defined a dual motive case as one in which the "existence of both
a 'good' and a 'bad' reason for the employer's action requires further
inquiry into the role played by each motive."55 One should not expect
Wright Line to have any effect in the many cases which do not fall
within this category. To examine its actual effect, therefore, it is first
necessary to segregate post- Wright Line decisions into those which meet
this definition and those which do not.
B. Identlfcation Of The Cases Likely To Be Affected
As noted above, Wright Line was developed to deal with dual motive
cases, that is, cases where credible evidence exists that at least two
causes, one proper, and one improper, played some role in motivating
employer action. Mount Healthy provides a rather pure example of a
dual motive case. The Board of Education candidly conceded that two
activities on Doyal's part precluded his further employment. One of
those activities was protected by the first amendment and one was not.
Both causes undeniably played some real and tangible role in motivating the Board of Education to refuse renewal of Doyal's employment
contract.
In order to segregate post-Wright Line Board decisions meeting this
definition from others it is helpful to first develop a clear understanding
as to what additional categories of section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1)
cases placing motive at issue exist.
Wright Line defines two major categories of cases alleging violation
of section 8(a)(3) or section 8(a)(1) which place motive at issue. The
second major category recognized in Wright Line is identified as "pretext" cases and defined to include all cases when,
[tihe purported rule or circumstance advanced by the employer did
not exist, or was not in fact, relied upon. When this occurs, the rea55. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084.
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son advanced by the employer may be termed pretextual. Since no
legitimate business justification for
the discipline exists, there is, by
56
strict definition, no dual motive.
This definition, in fact, embraces two types of cases. The first type of
case characterized as "pretextual" by the Board is that in which, "the
purported rule or circumstance advanced by the employer did not exist." The second type of case characterized by the Board as "pretextual" is that in which, "the purported rule or circumstance advanced by
the employer" can be shown to have existed but, "was not, in fact, relied upon." The former category is far more narrow than the latter,
which encompasses all cases in which the Board rejects employer testimony as undeserving of credit or insufficiently probative to meet the
General Counsel'sprimafacie case. As acknowledged in Wright Line,
the Board has generally used the "pretext" label to encompass both
cases meeting the narrow definition of pretext and cases encompassing
the more broad definition of pretext.
All courts of appeals are not in agreement with the Board's use of the
"pretext" label and some have insisted that this label be limited to that
more narrow group of cases in which "the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the employer did not exist." For example, in TR W,
Inc. v. NLRB,57 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opined as
follows:
The very nature of a "pretext" is a false or sham reason. When the
employer advances a legitimate reason for the discharge, and it is not
shown that this reason is untrue, the case cannot be characterized as a
pretext case but must be considered a "dual-motive" case. 58
Given this difference of opinion, the remainder of this article will distinguish between the two categories of pretext cases encompassed by
the Board's definition. The label "Pretext I" will be used to refer to
cases in which "the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the
employer did not exist" and the label "Pretext II" will be used to refer
to cases in which the trier of fact is not convinced after review of all the
evidence that, "the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the
employer. . . was. . ., in fact, relied upon."
Although Wright Line itself only references two types of cases alleging violation of section 8(a)(3) or section 8(a)(1) which place motive at
issue, many cases may not be properly categorized as either pretext
cases or dual motive cases. Several other categories must be defined in
order to evaluate adequately the decisions rendered since Wright Line,
56. Id.
57. 654 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
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determine the areas in which the Wright Line formulation might be
expected to have some impact, and test the degree to which Wright
Line has accomplished its objectives.
Pretext cases, by definition, result in a finding that the Act has been
violated because the employer either fails to establish the facts asserted
in its defense (Pretext I) or fails to convince the trier of fact that the
event or conduct asserted was actually a motivating factor in causing
employer action (Pretext II). An analogous category of cases exists
which may be seen as the "flip side" to the pretext characterization. In
some cases, review of all evidence convinces the trier of fact that the
General Counsel has failed to offer probative evidence that discriminatory motive played any part whatsoever in the action contested. In
such cases, the trier of fact concludes there to have been a single motive
for the contested action, namely, a permissible motive.
Two other categories of "single motive" cases exist. In a minority of
cases, almost no evidence is offered by the employer to combat the
General Counsel's evidence that the contested action was improperly
motivated. In such a case, the trier of fact has no alternative but to
conclude that a single, impermissible motive existed for the contested
action. Cases alleging independent violations of section 8(a)(1) give
rise to a last category of "single motive" cases. In many such cases, no
dispute exists as to what event or conduct precipitated employer action.
The sole dispute concerns whether that conduct is protected by the
NRLA. The remainder of this article will use the labels "Single Motive
IG" (meaning single "good" motive), "Single Motive IB" (meaning
single "bad" motive), and "Single Motive II," respectively, to reference
the three types of single motive cases here described.
In sum, the following categories of cases will be identified and used
for purposes of determining Wright Line's impact on the resolution of
ULP cases and its success in accomplishing its stated goals:
Pretext I Case: The event/conduct allegedly causing legitimate employer action cannot be established factually. In such a case, the
Board will infer a discriminatory motive if the record establishes
union activity, knowledge of that activity on the employer's part and
union animus.
Pretext !! Case.- The event allegedly causing legitimate employer action is established factually, but the record considered as a whole
establishes that this event was not an activating factor in producing
the contested discipline or other adverse action.
Single Motive IG Case. No convincing evidence of discriminatory
motive is found.
Single Motive IB Case. No legitimate employer motive is asserted.
Single Motive II Case: No dispute exists as to what event/conduct
883
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precipitated employer action. The sole dispute concerns whether
that conduct is protected by the Act.
Dual Motive Case. The employer was, in fact, influenced by both
1) union animus and 2) unprotected conduct which is shown to have
taken place in deciding to take the contested action.
C. The Impact of Wright Line
As noted above, 59 the body of cases studied for purposes of
determining Wright Lines' impact in this article involved approximately 226 separate allegations of section 8(a)(3) violations and independent section 8(a)(1) violations placing motive at issue. When the
facts found and conclusions stated in those cases are analyzed, it becomes clear that only a small number strictly meet the definition for a
dual motive case stated above, namely, a case in which two or more
motives, at least one proper and one improper, are found to have
played a real and tangible role in producing the contested employer

action.
Of the cases encompassed in this study, 45 are best characterized as
Pretext I cases.6 0 In this group of cases the Board concludes that the
employer failed to offer probative evidence establishing the event or
conduct claimed to have acted as a legitimate cause for action. Given
the absence of any legitimate motive in these cases, there is no need for
59. See supra note 6.
60. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1981); Model A and Model T Motor
Car Reproduction Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1981) (AD Hall); Progressive Supermarkets, Inc.,
259 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1981); L & M Radiator, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1981); S.W. Hart & Co.,

258 N.L.R.B. No. 192 (1981); American Geri-Care, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (1981); Lattimer
Assoc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1981); Am. Interstate Freight Lines, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (1981);
Cumberland Farms Dairy, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (1981); Arrow Automotive Indus., 258 N.L.R.B.
No. 116 (1981) (ADs Biggs & Smith); Dimensions In Metal, Inc, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1981) (AD
Williams); Valley Plaza, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1981) (two groups of ADs); St. John's Constr.
Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1981) (two groups of ADs); Transp. Management Corp., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (AD Faustrum); Timberline Energy Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1981);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1981); George W. Kugler, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No.
7 (1981); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 171 (1981) (ADs Long & Johnson); Bldg.
Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local 420, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (1981); Rish Equip. Co., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1981) (ADs Ake, Morris, M. Aldridge, R. Aldridge and Palmer); El Charro
Mexican Foods, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 982 (1981); Builders Distrib. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1981); Salem Paint, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1981); Welfare, Pension and
Vacation Funds, Blasters, Drillrunners and Miners Local 29, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 170 (1981); Heartland Food Warehouse, Division of Purity Supreme Supermarkets, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (1981);
Art Steel of California, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1981); Southern Alleghenies Disposal Serv.,
Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (1981); Vee Cee Provision, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1981); Pace
Oldsmobile, Inc., 256 N.L.RB. No. 111 (1981) (AD Kennedy); Maryland Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1981); Maxwell's Plum, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1981); Castle Instant Maintenance/Maid, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1981); Modesti Bros., Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No.
126 (1981); Gasko & Meyer, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1981) (AD Fulton); Glover Bottled Gas
Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1981); Bond Press, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1981); Concord Furniture Indus., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1981); Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No.
54 (1981) (AD Shea).
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application of the Wright Line formula for assessing the effects of
mixed motives.
Of the cases under study, 95 can best be characterized as Pretext II

cases. 61 In these cases, the employer was able to offer probative evidence of the event or conduct alleged to have legitimately motivated

the contested action. A review of all of the evidence, however, convinced the Board that the event or conduct relied upon by the employer
61. Teamsters Local 515, 259 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (1981); Mathews Ready Mix, Inc., 259
N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1981); Model A and Model T Motor Car Reproduction Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. No.
77 (1981) (ADs Rine and Hunt); Brook Shoe Mfg. Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1981); BrowningFerris Indus., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1981); Union Oil Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1981); PrenticeHall, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (1981); Jackson Dairy Prod., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (1981); Jaybil
Steel Prods., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1981) (ADs Ramis, Pardol and Rodriguez/Salmon); Ingram
Farms, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1981); St. Mary's Home, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (AD
Mitchell); Leisure Time Tours, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (ADs Brunner and Frey); Quebecor
Group, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1981) (ADs Harris, Leventhal and Brennan); Blackstone Co., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981) (ADs Nagy and Moffat); Arrow Automotive Indus., 258 N.L.R.B. No.
116 (1981) (AD Wilkie); Rosaver's Supermarkets, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1981); McAllen
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (1981); Lord & Taylor, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (1981);
Dimensions In Metal, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1981) (ADs Campbell and Boyce-Saulsberry);
Webb Ford, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1981); Transp. Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61
(1981) (ADs Moore, Johnson and Bassett-Cahill); Thurston Motor Lines, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 48
(1981); Scuba Mfg. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1981); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B.
No. 172 (1981); Liberty Homes, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1981); Wisdom Indus., 257 N.L.R.B.
No. 164 (1981); 15 East 48th Restaurant, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (1981) (ADs Stamatopoulos, Kiropoulos and Marinis); Royal Dev. Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1981); Chem. Fab Corp., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 142; King Soopers, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1981); RAI Research Corp., 257
N.L.R.B.No. 127 (1981); Addy Mechanical Fabricators & Constructors, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No.
111 (1981) (AD Decker); Wellington Hall Nursing Home, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1981);
Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (1981); Joseph Magnin Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 86
(1981); Am. Tool & Eng'g Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1981) (several ADs); Kawasaki Motors
Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1981) (AD Bennett); Sioux Prods., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1981) (AD
Arroyo); Dining & Kitchen Admin., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1981); Inland Steel Co., 257 N.L.R.B.
No. 13 (1981); Palomar Transp., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1981); Mark I Tune-Up Centers, 256
N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1981); Polk Bros. Concrete Prods., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1981) (AD Kimbrel);
U.S. Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1981); Turner Tool & Joint Rebuilders Corp., 256
N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1981); Metropolitan Life Ins., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (1981); Golden Beverage
of San Antonio, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1981) (several ADs); Together We Stand Womens' Guild
Day Care Center, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981) (AD Stovall); Automotive Armature Co., 256
N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1981); Transp. Management Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1981); Wean United,
Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1981); Associated Milk Producers, 255 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1981);
Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1981); Doug Hartley, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 97
(1981); Zurn Indus., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1981); Guerdon Indus., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1981)
(ADs Merritt, Jones and Kirby/Short); Five Star Air Freight Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1981);
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers Local 1105, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (1981) (applying
Wright Line to an alleged Section 8(b)(1)(A) violation and finding the respondent's proffered motive for failure to pursue a grievance not to have, in fact, been relied upon); Quality Broadcasting
Corp., 254 N.L.R.B: No. 118 (1981); Kleinert's, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1981); Bd. of Trustees of
City Hospital, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1981); Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No.
54 (1981) (ADs Girard and Fowley); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 254 N.L.R.B.
No. 43 (1981) (ADs Saunders & Sawyer); Gossen Co., A Division of the United States Gypsum
Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1981) (ADs Magee, Parr and White/Lavine); Doral Bldg. Serv., 254
N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1981); Overnite Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1981) (ADs Brown, Ennix,
Wiggington, and Walker); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 871 (1980); Russ Toggs,
Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767 (1980); Joshua's, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 588 (1980); Weather Tamer, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. 293 (1980); Valley Cabinet & Mfg., 253 N.L.R.B. 98 (1980); The Motor Convoy, Inc.,
252 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1980); United Parcel Serv., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1980); Herman Bros.,
Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 848 (1980); Taylor-Dunn Mfg., 252 N.L.R.B. 799 (1980); Behring Int'L, Inc.,
252 N.L.R.B. 354 (1980).
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did not, in fact, play an activating role in motivating the contested employer action. Numerous factors such as evidence that the employer
was engaging in surveillance of the AD for the purpose of developing a
pretextual reason for discipline,62 timing destructive of the employer's
defense,63 significant inconsistencies in the defense offered by the employer,64 statements admitting a true improper reason for discipline,65
or prior condonation of the misconduct relied upon 66 are noted by the
Board in these decisions in support of its conclusion that the legitimate
motive proffered by the employer was not an actual motivating factor.
Many commentators are diinclined to distinguish this group of cases
from those categorized as true dual motive cases in this discussion.67
This group of cases must be segregated, however, in order to identify
the effect Wright Line has had where mixed motivation is proven.
Where a single (bad) motive is found operative, the result will be the
same no matter what rule is adopted for separating the precise effects of
mixed motives. If the evidence taken as a whole convinces the Board
that the employer's proffered legitimate excuse was not, in fact, relied
upon to any degree, then a further finding that the Act has been violated is warranted whether the "in part" test, the "but for" test, the
"dominant motive" test, the Wright Line formulation or any other test
62. See, e.g., Quebecor Group, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1981) (Re: AD Brennan); Dimensions
In Metal, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1981) (Re: AD Campbell); Valley Plaza, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B.
No. 76 (1981) (Re: five dinner waitresses); Webb Ford, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1981); Red Ball
Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 871 (1980); United Parcel Serv., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1980).
63. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1981); Jackson Dairy Prods. Co.,
258 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (1981); Transp. Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (Re: AD
Johnson); Chem. Fab Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1981); Joseph Magnin Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No.
86 (1981); Turner Tool & Joint Rebuilders Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1981); Together We
Stand Womens' Guild Daycare Center, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981); (Re: ADs Black and Stovall);
Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1981); Guerdon Indus., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 86
(1981) (Re: ADs Kirby and Short); Gossen Co., A Division of the United States Gypsum Co., 254
N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1981) (Re: ADs White and Lavine); Russ Toggs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767 (1980).
64. See, e.g., Model A & Model T Motor Car Reproduction Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 77
(1981) (Re: AD Rhine); Jackson Dairy Prods., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (1981); Jaybil Steel Prods.,
258 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1981) (Re: AD Ramis); Ingram Farms, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1981);
Blackstone Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981) (Re: AD Moffat); Transp. Management Corp., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (Re: AD Moore); Royal Dev. Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1981); Doug
Hartley, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1981); Gossen Co., A Division of the United States Gypsum
Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1981); Russ Toggs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 767 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Matthews Ready Mix, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1981); Jaybil Steel Prods., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1981) (Re: AD Ramis); Royal Dev. Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1981); King
Soopers, A Division of Dillon Companies, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1981); Joseph Magnin Co., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1981); U.S. Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1981); Turner Tool & Joint
Rebuilders Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (1981); Wean United, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1981);
Quality Broadcasting Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1981); Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 254
N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1981) (Re: ADs Gerard and Fowley); Gossen Co., A Division of the United
States Gypsum Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1981) (Re: AD Parr).
66. See, e.g., Transp. Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (Re: AD Moore);
Mark I Tune-Up Centers, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1981); Together We Stand Womens' Guild Day
Care Center, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981) (Re: AD Black); Guerdon Indus., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 86
(1981) (Re: ADs Merrit and Jones).
67. See Coleman, supra note 36, at 209 n.29.
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is applied.6 8 To be sure, the Board has differed with various courts of
appeals as to the outcome warranted in cases falling within this category. Those differences of opinion, however, revolve around the
weight to be afforded competing testimony, not the legal rule which

should obtain where two motives, one proper and one improper, are
found to have both played a contributing role in motivating employer
action.
A fairly substantial portion of the cases encompassed by this study
fall within one of the single motive categories defined herein. No legiti-

mate employer motive is asserted in 14 cases considered by the Board
during this period and those cases are best characterized as Single Mo-

tive 1B cases.69 In 46 cases considered as part of this study, the Board
found no convincing evidence of a discriminatory motive, thereby requiring it to conclude that a single legitimate motive existed for the
employer action originally contested. These cases are best categorized
as Single Motive IG cases.7 0 Additionally, 12 cases within the study are
68. This fact and the large portion of section 8(a)(3) cases in this category are relied upon by
other commentators to support their view that the Wright Line formula is an inconsequential
restatement unlikely to have any practical effect. The fact that this substantial category of cases
will not likely be affected by the Wright Line formulation does not, however, preclude a very
substantial effect from application of that formulation to true dual motive cases. This is precisely
why cases in each category must be segregated in order to test Wright Line's actual impact.
69. Townsend & Bottum, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1981); Piggly Wiggly, Tuscaloosa Division Commodores, Pt. Terminal Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1981); Cal-Walts, Inc., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1981); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1981)
(AD Hammond); Freight, Constr. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 287, 257
N.L.R.B. No. 168 (1981); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1981); Western Marine
Elec., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1981); Bumup & Sims, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1981); Together
We Stand Women's Guild Day Care Center, 256 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981) (AD Henry); Kevah
Konner, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1981); St. Regis Paper Co., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1981).
70. Gerson Elec. Constr. Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1981); Model A & Model T Motor Car
Reproduction Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1981) (AD Hadley); Caffe Giovanni, Inc., 259
N.L.R.B. No. 31 (1981) (ADs Krivan & Frisch); Haynes-Trane Serv. Agency, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B.
No. 12 (1981); B. H. L. Mfg. Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1981); Clarklift of St. Louis, Inc., 259
N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1981); Cato Oil & Grease Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 153 (1981); St. Mary's Home,
Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (1981) (AD Johnson); C.W. Sweeney and Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 96
(1981); Laredo Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1981) (several ADs); Transp. Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (AD Lennon); Mineola Ford Sales, 258 N.L.R.B. No.
52 (1981); St. Luke's Hospital, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1981); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical
Center, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1981) (AD Neider); The Evening News Ass'n, 258 N.L.R.B. No. 20
(1981); Addy Mechanical Fabricators & Constructors, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. Ill (1981) (ADs
who were laid off); Farmers Ins. Group, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1981); Kawasaki Motors Corp., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1981) (AD Clare); Plywood Los Angeles, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1981); Tell
City Chair Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981); Sioux Prods., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1981) (AD Andrade); TaraCorp Indus., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1981); Thom Brown Shoes, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No.
27 (1981); The Swingline Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1981); John Blue Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 83
(1981); Jacobo Marti & Sons, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 189 (1981); Fruehauf Corp., 255 N.L.R.B.
No. 125 (1981); Mini-Indus., Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1981); Gasko & Meyer, Inc., 255
N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1981) (AD Peters); Stewart Granite Enter., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1981); Southwestern Broadcasters, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1981); Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 254 N.L.R.B.
No. 172 (1981) (AD Dowell); Webb-Centrix Constr., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (1981); Carolina Paper
Mills, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1981); I.T.O. Corp. of Ameriport, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1981);
Overnite Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1981) (ADs Cox, Allen, Cotton, Pirkey, Darr, Gause,
Hoover, Morris, and Adkins); United Broadcasting Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 697 (1980).
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best characterized as Single Motive II cases.7 ' Obviously, none of the

cases in these categories provide a basis for testing Wright Line's effect
upon application since none of them posed any need to determine the
precise effects of contemporaneously operating motives.
Only 18 of the cases in which the Board had applied Wright Line

through the end of 1981 are truly dual motive cases, that is, cases in
which at least two motives, one proper and one improper, are found to
72
have played a real and tangible part in producing employer action.

This might lead one to think that controversy over the appropriate rule
to be applied in dual motive cases is nothing more than a tempest in a
teapot. It would initially appear that Wright Line is unlikely to have
significant impact on administration of the Act or effectuation of employee rights no matter what its specific impact, given the small percentage of published Section 8(a)(3) and Section 8(a)(1) decisions
affected.
This initial appearance, however, is deceptive. The overwhelming
majority of ULP charges filed are resolved without issuance of a com-

plaint, a formal hearing or an ultimate decision by the Board. Recent
statistics suggest that no more than approximately 13% of ULP charges
result in issuance of a complaint.73 Local regional offices are able to

resolve the remainder through solicitation of withdrawal or dismissal
where found to be without merit, or settlement where found meritori-

ous. An additional portion are resolved after issuance of a complaint,
thereby precluding any need for issuance of a Board decision.
Obviously, in determining whether to solicit withdrawal or settlement, the Board's local offices are guided by published Board decisions.
71. R.P. Scherer (Southeast) Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1981); G.H. Bass & Co., 258
N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1981); Addy Mechanical Fabricators & Constructors, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. I 11
(1981) (AD Fierro); General Elec. Corp., Installation & Serv. Eng'r Div., 256 N.L.R.B., No. 124
(1981); Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1981) (strikers accused of misconduct); Garrett R.R. Car & Equipment, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (1981); Egar Employment, Inc., 255
N.L.R.B. No. 16 (1981); Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (1981) (AD Rushton);
General Motors Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1981); McCormick & Co., Inc., Grocery Prods.
Div., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1981); Lummus Indus., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 79, enforced, 679 F.2d
229, 233 n.6 (Ilth Cir. 1982) (observing absence of need for WrightLine analysis m such a circumstance) (1981); Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1981).
72. Stop and Shop Cos., Medi Mart Div., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981); High Energy Corp.,
259 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1981); Magnesium Casting Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981); Liberty Men's
Formals, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1981); Litton Mellonics Systems Div., a Div. of Litton Systems, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1981); Transp. Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981)
(AD Sullivan); Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1981); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1981); Atlas Minerals, a Div. of Atlas
Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (1981); Bronco Wine Co., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1981); Sanitas Cura,
Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1981); Liberty Pavilion Nursing Home, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1981),
Badische Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (1981); Gossen Co., a Div. of the United States Gypsum
Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1981) (ADs Lampada and Beilke); Overnite Transp. Co., 254 NL.R.B.
No. 11 (1981) (ADs Morris and DeBoard); Herman Bros., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 848 (1980).
73. See Forty-FourthAnnual Report of NLRB; Fiscal Year 1979, reprintedin LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1981 274-82 (BNA 1981).

1983 / Wright Line
Any published decision in which Wright Line has had a determinative

effect on the outcome, therefore, is likely to produce a similar effect in
countless other cases resolved at the regional level.7 4 There is ample

practical justification for scrutinizing the precise impact Wright Line
has had in those cases which can properly be defined as dual motive
cases.

When the 18 true dual motive cases arising since Wright Line are
examined, one characteristic becomes apparent immediately. The

Board concluded that the Act had not been violated in two-thirds of
those cases (12 out of 18). 75 This contrasts with the General Counsel's

usual "loss rate" in cases alleging violation of Section 8(a)(3), which
has been estimated to run at 20%.76 This also establishes a marked

departure from pre-Wright Line law. By definition, a dual motive case
is one in which employer action has been shown to have beenpartially
motivated by a desire to discourage union activity. Under the prior "in
part" test, therefore, the Board would have found a Section 8(a)(3) violation in each and every one of these cases. Further inquiry is clearly
warranted to determine what conduct is now permitted which once
would have been made the subject of a Board remedial order.
Four of the 12 dual motive cases in which the Board dismissed the

claim of discrimination disclose a rather disturbing trend. In each of
the four, a management representative did or said something clearly

conveying to the AD and co-workers that management had intended to
retaliate against the AD for union activities. These statements were

relied upon to support the finding that a discriminatory motive played
some part in producing the employer's action. In each of the four
cases, the Board ultimately concluded that no discrimination violative
of section 8(a)(3) was present in reliance upon the Wright Line test.
The Board found that the employer had consistently applied a uniform
policy and had not treated the AD disparately. In other words, the
74. In 1979, 17,220 ULP charges were filed alleging unlawful discrimination against employees in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In this same period, only 5,413 complaints were
issued by NLRB regional offices in connection with all alleged ULPs made the subject of charges.
Clearly, administration of the Act falls, to a large extent, on the Board's regional offices and any
effect of Wright Line observed in published decisions is bound to have substantial ramifications at
that level.
75. Stop and Shop Cos., Medi Mart Div., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981); Magnesium Casting
Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981); Liberty Men's Formals, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1981); Litton Mellonics Systems Div., a Div. of Litton Systems, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1981); Transp.
Management Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1981) (AD Sullivan); Consolidated Freightways Corp.
of Delaware, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 177 (1981); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 33
(1981); Liberty Pavilion Nursing Home, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1981); Badische Corp., 254
N.L.R.B. No. 164 (1981); Gossen Co., a Div. of the United States Gypsum Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No.
41 (1981) (ADs Lampada and Beilke); Overnite Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1981) (AD
Morris).
76. See Coleman, supra note 36, at 209.
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employer succeeded in establishing that "the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected activity.""7 The Board
further concluded that under Wright Line its only obligation was to
place the AD in "no worse a position than if he had not engaged in
[protected] conduct,"7 a goal accomplished by dismissing the allegation of discrimination.
The scenario evolving in these cases produces one very unacceptable
effect. Any employee hearing or gaining knowledge of the employer's
statement declaring a retaliatory intent is left with the distinct impression that the employer has punished a union adherent and gotten away
with it. While attendance at the ULP hearing and review of the
Board's decision might convince such an employee that the AD was
not, in fact, dealt with less favorably than would have been the case
had he not engaged in union activity, such elucidating events are not,
of course, likely to take place. Those who remain in the work force,
therefore, are not disabused of the impression that union activity will
produce retaliation and the old familiar "chilling effect" is present.
Each of the following cases illustrate this disturbing effect: Stop and
Shop Cos., Medi Mart Division,7 9 Magnesium Casting Co.,80 Liberly
Men's Formals,Inc. ,"1 andEl Dupont de Nemours & Co. 8 2 The earli-

est of these cases, E.Z Dupont, concerned placement of an employee on
probation. The AD, Thomas, voiced union support in a March 21,
197983 meeting. Only three days thereafter, he received an evaluation
criticizing his relations with his supervisors. Two months thereafter, he
suffered a hernia and a dispute arose as to whether related medical
costs would be paid by the company's regular health insurance program. Eventually payment was made, but in the interim Thomas filed
a worker's compensation claim which was also eventually resolved in
his favor.8 4
While the worker's compensation claim was pending, Thomas received an "unsatisfactory performance contact" (hereinafter referred to
as UPC) which criticized him for (1) a September 30 dispute with two
supervisors; (2) an October 18 instance of rudeness to a safety representative from another company; and (3) Thomas' failure to sign standard
77. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
78. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1086 (quoting from Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977)).
79. 259 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981).
80. 259 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981).
81. 258 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1981).
82. 257 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1981).
83. Id. at 143. All dates used hereinafter during the discussion of this case will refer to 1979
unless otherwise specified.
84. Id at 144.
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practice and procedure revisions in light of questions he had regarding
the revisions.85
Shortly after receiving the UPC, at the suggestion of a coworker,
Thomas contacted a supervisor (Monroe)16 whom he knew personally.
Monroe reported that, Thomas had been a primary topic of conversation at a meeting involving 13 supervisors. Monroe further reported
that Thomas was characterized as a "threat" at this meeting because of
his workers' compensation claim and his union activities. Lastly,
Monroe reported that when he questioned the company's views regarding Thomas he was told to discuss the matter with one of the two supervisors who had been involved in the September 30 dispute upon which
the UPC was partially based and was further accused of being "operator oriented."87 One may presume that Thomas reported this conversation to the co-worker who originally suggested the discussion with
Monroe and possibly to others as well.
Under standard company procedures, follow-up discussions were
conducted with Thomas after issuance of the UPC in which he was
criticized for "discrediting" supervision and adding comments to
posted bulletins. On April 19, 1980, Thomas was placed on probation.
The notice placing him on probation cited four grounds for this disciplinary action: (1) an April 1979, incident in which Thomas required a
supervisory trainee to go through his immediate supervisor in order to
give certain instructions; (2) a June 1979 claim of rudeness on Thomas'
part to a supervisor in a telephone call; (3) Thomas' failure in September 1979 to sign certain job cycles; and (4) an April 1980 incident in
which Thomas sarcastically criticized a supervisor for failure to wear
required safety equipment.88 Although three of these four grounds for
the probation notice occurred prior to issuance of the UPC, which had
been the prior step in progressive discipline, the Board found placement of Thomas on probation to be consistent with the employer's
usual disciplinary policies and therefore concluded that Dupont had
succeeded in establishing "that the same action would have taken place
even in the absence of a protected conduct."8 9 In light of this conclusion, under the second step of the analysis required by Wright Line, no
violation of section 8(a)(3) was found. Any employees learning of
Monroe's disclosure that the company intended to deal with the threat
posed by Thomas' union and other protected activities were, therefore,
85. Id at 145.

86. Id at 142.
87. Id Although Monroe denied the comments attributed to him in the text, the ALJ discredited this denial and the facts were found to have taken place as summarized in the text.

88. Id at 147.
89. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
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left with the impression that such retaliation had been successfully
accomplished. 90
A similar result is reflected even more powerfully in Liberty Men's
Formals. In that case, employees Angell, Pace and Kpakiwa complained to management about pay they received for working a Memorial Day holiday. The complaint was expressed in a manner which
attracted significant attention from coworkers, a fact clearly disapproved by supervision. Employees Pace and Kpakiwa were terminated
inthe fall of the same year for the stated reason that they were "poor
workers." Employee Angell, the AD in this case, testified at an unemployment insurance hearing on behalf of her two former co-workers.
She herself was terminated one week after giving this testimony. 9'
The three employees then filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Commission which gave rise to a fact finding conference. At the fact finding conference, the company official responsible
for having made the termination decisions clearly commented that he
had intended to terminate all three employees after the "Memorial Day
incident" but 92had been unable to do so because of difficulty in finding
replacements.
At the ULP trial, the employer justified Angell's termination on the
grounds that she was unable to work 40 hours per week, which was
asserted to be an absolute requirement for employment. Angell had
been working approximately 24 hours per week for two months.93 The
Board found that Angell's employer successfully established a consistent policy requiring all employees to work at least 40 hours per week
and therefore concluded that, "the same action would have taken place
even in the absence of the protected conduct. 94 Given this answer to
the second question posed in Wright Line, the Board concluded no violation of section 8(a)(3) to have taken place. This result left all employees who had been in attendance at the Pennsylvania Human Rights
Commission fact finding conference and all who learned of supervision's comments there with the clear impression that Liberty Men's
Formals had succeeded in retaliating against Angell's protected activities by waiting for a suitable excuse to sever her employment.
90. The Board found Monroe's comments to have violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As will

be discussed in infra text accompanying notes 102-109, however, the "remedy" issued as a result of
that finding is not likely to have dissipated the impermissible effect described in the text here.
91. Liberty Men's Formals,258 N.L.R.B. at 1304.
92. Id The management representative to whom this statement was attributed denied having
testified to that effect before the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission. His denial, however,
was discredited by the ALJ and the facts were found to have taken place as summarized in the
text.
93. Id
94. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
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A similar pattern is observable in Magnesium Casting Co., and Stop
and Shop Cos. In the former case, the AD, Thomas, leafletted for a
union. Thereafter, he was told by supervision to "keep a low profile
regarding union activities.""5 After receiving a desired transfer, he
leafletted again and was laid off the very next day. The Board ultimately concluded that this layoff was substantiated by economic facts
establishing that, "the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected conduct. 9 6 Given this answer to the second
question posed in Wright Line, no violation of section 8(a)(3) was
found. The timing of this layoff, however, would certainly leave any
employee learning of supervision's caution to Thomas to, "keep a low
profile regarding union activities" with the impression that Magnesium
Casting had successfully retaliated for such activities.9 7
In Stop andShop Cos., the AD, Goodusky, a pharmacist, was terminated for "being under the influence of alcohol." He contacted a supervisor regarding the reasons for the termination and was essentially
told that management had been "out to get him" ever since "the incident."9 " When the supervisor was pressed to explain what he meant by
"the incident" he ultimately agreed that his meaning had been "the
union."9 9 The Board concluded that Goodusky was terminated pursuant to a consistent company policy and that Stop and Shop had therefore succeeded in demonstrating that "the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct." Given this
answer to the second question posed in Wright Line, no violation of
Section 8(a)(3) was found. Any employees learning of the disclosures
made to Goodusky by supervision were, however, certainly left with
the impression that the company had succeeded in retaliating against
such activities.
In sum, Wright Line clearly has had an impact on the outcome in
ULP cases. It has freed some employers, whose representatives have
made statements highly likely to discourage future protected activities,
from effective remedial action.
95. Magnesium Casting Co., 259 N.L.R.B. at 422. The supervisor at issue denied having
made the statement attributed to him. The ALJ discredited this denial, however, and the facts
were found to have taken place as summarized in the text.
96. Id at 419.
97. The Board found the comments at issue to have violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As
will be discussed in infra text accompanying notes 102-109, however, the "remedy" issued as a
result of that finding is not likely to have dissipated the impermissible effect described in the text
here.
98. Stop andShop Cos., 259 N.L.R.B. at 871. A tape was available of the relevant conversa-

tion which was relied upon by the ALL
99. Id
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IV.

WRIGHTLINE'S SUCCESS IN ACCOMPLISHING
ITS STATED GOALS

A. Accommodation of ll Litigants'Legitimate Interests
1.

The Protection of Employee Rights

The Board offered the Wright Line formulation as a test more likely
to accommodate all litigants' legitimate interests than the Board's prior
"in part" test. One handicap is encountered when one seeks to determine whether the Wright Line formulation satisfactorily preserves employee rights protected by the "in part" test: the Board does not
identify in Wright Line what employee rights the "in part" test was
designed to protect. This produces cause for concern because better
accommodation of all litigants' legitimate interests should generally not
be undertaken without first developing an understanding as to the precise nature of all litigants' legitimate interests.
Since this was not done in Wright Line, we must speculate as to the
nature of the legitimate employee interests protected under the earlier
"in part" test. Obviously, that test protected employees against discrimination, a legitimate protection under section 8(a)(3). The "in
part" test, however, did more than that. It also assured the availability
of remedial action anytime an employer allowed its desire to retaliate
against a union adherent to "show its head" in the course of reaching
an employment decision. Was this a legitimate employee interest?
One senses that if this retaliatory desire is expressed in a way disclosing
an intent to "chill unionism," precluding this effect is a legitimate employee interest sought to be served by the Act.' 00
Wright Line would appear to protect employees against discrimination satisfactorily. A remedy is available unless the employer can show
that the AD was treated exactly as he would have been had he not been
a union adherent. The second interest, availability of remedial action
in response to employer retaliation against union adherents, however,
is not equally wellserved. Wright Line does nothing to alleviate the
chilling effect likely to result when an employer's desire to retaliate
against union activity appears to play some part in producing an employment decision. Stop and Shop Cos., Magnesium Casting Co., Liberty Men's Formals and E.L Dupont clearly establish this deficiency on
Wright Line's part.
Is this, in fact, a legitimate employee interest which should have been
preserved in Wright Line? As noted above, one senses that expression
of a retaliatory desire in a manner disclosing an intent to "chill union100. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965).
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ism," is an evil to which the Act is directed. On the other hand, the
chilling effect described here cannot be brought within the literal scope
of section 8(a)(3)'s prohibitions because discriminatory conduct is an
essential element to a section 8(a)(3) violation. If an employee has not,
in fact, been treated differently than a similarly situated person without
union sympathies would have been, then discrimination is not shown.
The answer is simple. Upon originally promulgating the "in part"
test, the Board intuitively recognized avoidance of this chilling effect to
be an interest which the Act seeks to serve. It improperly, however,
sought to protect this interest under section 8(a)(3). Now it has just as
improperly abandoned that interest altogether. In matter of fact, this is
an interest to which section 8(a)(1) is directed and that section should
be the basis for affording protection.
In the four cases discussed above, the employer made statements
through its agents suggesting that a desire to retaliate played some part
in producing an employment decision. Such a statement clearly runs
afoul of section 8(a)(1)'s prohibition of any conduct which restrains or
coerces employees in the exercise of protected rights.10 ' Allegations of
such section 8(a)(1) violations in the context of section 8(a)(3) cases
have not, however, been particularly prevalent. There was no urgent
need to do so under the "in part" test because it allowed a finding that
section 8(a)(3) had been violated in such circumstances and assured
remedial action sufficient to counteract this ill effect. Wright Line,
however, removes this assurance of remedial action and leaves a void
which to date has not been effectively filled by either the Board10 2 or its
General Counsel. 10 3
This raises a poignant question. Will traditional section 8(a)(1) remedies be sufficient to fill the void left by Wright Line and counteract the
effects created when an employer leads remaining employees to believe
it has taken adverse action in order to retaliate against union activity?
Under existing law, such a section 8(a)(1) violation is "remedied"
through the posting of a notice informing employees that the employer
will not, in the future, make statements disclosing a desire to retaliate." 4 The notice is generally phrased in terms comparable to the state101. Modulus Corporation, 236 N.L.R.B. 967, 969 (1978), cited with approvalin Scooba Mfg.
Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1981).
102. Neither Wright Line nor any subsequently issued decision of the Board which applies
that test cautions the General Counsel and ALJs to be alert for cases of the type described in the
text and the need to determine whether conduct violative of section 8(a)(1)'s prohibition has
occurred.
103. The General Counsel's memorandum to Regional Directors regarding application of the
Wright Line decision does not identify the problem discussed here. See, Memorandum 80-58 November 4, 1980, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1980, at 311 (BNA 1981).
104. Modulus Corporation, 236 N.L.R.B. 967 (1978).
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ment alleged.10
One cannot reasonably expect this to be an effective remedy under
the circumstances discussed. When an employer has disclosed retaliatory intent resulting in a chilling effect, posting a notice of the type
described merely assures that no further chilling effect will be created
through comparable disclosures; it does nothing to dissipate the existing impression gained by employees that their employer has succeeded in retaliating in a given situation. The notice in essence says, "I
won't further tell you what I'm up to because I've already made that
pretty clear." At a minimum, the notice used in these cases should
clearly inform employees that their employer will not retaliate as suggested in prior comments, not merely that it will cease to make such
comments.
In some cases, even more may be required. When employers have
terminated supervisors unprotected by the Act in such a manner as to
send a clear message to protected employees that a similar fate will
befall them should they engage in union activities, the Board has found
a section 8(a)(1) violation and required reinstatement of the supervisor
as a remedy. This result has obtained even though the most immediate
beneficiary, the supervisor, has not been a cognizable victim of any
ULP. The Board has reasoned that reinstatement is necessary in such a
circumstance in order to effectively assure protected employees that
their employer will not succeed in retaliating against them because of
union activities.
0 6
For example, in Brothers Three Cabinets,1
the Board majority
found that the employer terminated a supervisor and thereafter clearly
informed remaining workers that this action had been taken in response to the supervisor's union activities. The Board majority further
found that the termination occurred amidst a "widespread pattern of
misconduct" which was "motivated by a desire to discourage union activities among its employees in general."' 0 7 The Board majority concluded that discharge of the supervisor was effectuated in order to
provide an example to employees of their possible fate if they supported a union. The termination was found to have violated section
8(a)(1) and reinstatement was directed. A like result ensued in Shera105. See, e.g., Magnesium Casting Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981) (includes the statement,
"WE WILL NOT tell you to keep a low profile regarding the exercise of any of the rights described above.").
106. 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980). Although this decision was recently overruled, Parker-Robb
Chevrolet, 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1982), the rationale stated therein is nonetheless instructive and
useful in the analogous situation described in the text.
107. Id at 829.
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ton Puerto Rico Corp. 108

A comparable remedy should be considered in cases where an employer effectuates a termination which does not violate section 8(a)(3)

and simultaneously makes declarations that do violate section 8(a)(1)
by suggesting to remaining workers that this termination has been the

product of a desire to retaliate. In some fact situations it may not be
possible to dissipate the resulting chilling effect unless the terminated
employee is reinstated so as to assure coworkers that a retaliatory
scheme has not succeeded. The four cases discussed in this article" 9 do
not appear to reach this level on the facts established at hearing. The

disclosures of retaliatory intent do not appear to have been as widely
and effectively disseminated as were those in Brothers Three Cabinets
and Puerto Rico Sheraton. The extent of dissemination, however, was
not really made a topic of inquiry at hearing. In future cases, the General Counsel and the Board should carefully assess whether employer
comments regarding discharges ultimately found nondiscriminatory
have caused a sufficiently severe violation of section 8(a)(1) to require
reinstatement as the only sure means to cure the resulting chilling
0
effect. "1

108. 248 N.L.R.B. 867 (1980).
109. Stop and Shop Cos., Medi Mart Div., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981); Magnesium Casting
Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1981); Liberty Men's Formals, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1981); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1981).
110. Use of the remedy recommended in the text might be opposed in reliance upon section
10(c) of the Act. In 1947 the following provision was added to section 10(c) by amendment:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as employee who
has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 6494 (1947). Any reliance upon section 10(c) to
oppose the recommendation stated in the text is, however, misplaced. The report from the Committee on Education and Labor originally submitted in support of H.R. 3020 makes clear that the
amendment to section 10(c) proposed therein was not intended to bar use of reinstatement with
backpay as a remedy for combating restraint or coercion which might be found violative of section
8(a)(1). The report provided, in pertinent part,
The bill will require that the new Board's rulings shall be consistent with what the
-Supreme Court said in upholding the act, that it [the act]does not interfere with the normal right of the employer to select its employees or to
discharge them ....
The Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for
interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercisedfor other reasons
than... intimidationand coercion.
(LaborBoard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,301 U.S. 1, 45-46). The Boardmay
not "infer'an impropermotive when the evidence shows causefor discipline or discharge.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43, Reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. 333-34 (1947) (emphasis
added). The second sentence emphasized in his excerpt establishes that the amendment to section
10(c) was intended to preclude the Board from inferring a discriminatory motive where the record
establishes the cause for disciplinary action to have been legitimate. The first portion of this excerpt which has been emphasized illustrates that the amendment to section 10(c) was not intended
to preclude use of reinstatement with backpay as a remedy in any circumstance where it might be
necessary in order to relieve employees from "intimidation and coercion" violative of some portion of the Act. Where the manner in which a termination is effectuated causes a coercive effect
violative of section 8(a)(1), therefore, reinstatement with backpay may be utilized as a remedy, if
necessary to dissipate the coercive effort. The cases discussed at supra note 12 illustrate that the
Board has long considered itself to possess such authority, with Supreme Court approval.
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Protection of Legitimate Employer Interests

The Wright Line formulation clearly serves one valid employer interest by providing a framework within which employers may establish
that an adverse action would have been taken without regard to an
AD's protected activity and thereby avoid a finding that section 8(a)(3)
has been violated. Some employer representatives have criticized
Wright Line, however, on the grounds that it disserves a second legitimate employer interest by partially placing the burden of proof in ULP
cases upon the employer in contravention of the limitations stated in
section 10(c) of the Act."' Wright Line provides that once the General
Counsel has established protected conduct to have been a motivating
factor in the employer's decision, "the burden will shift to the employer
to demonstrate the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected conduct.""' 2
The Board's decision in WrightLine does not make clear whether the
"burden" which is to be shifted to the employer is the burden of persuasion (i.e., the risk of nonpersuasion) or solely the burden of moving
forward with the production of evidence. Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence clearly distinguishes between these two types of burdens in specifying the effects created by an evidentiary presumption:
...A presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains1 throughout
the
13
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
If the burden shifted to the employer by the Board in Wright Line is
merely the burden of production, employers have no valid complaint.
Clearly, the employer has an obligation to come forward with something at the conclusion of the General Counsel's prima facie case in
order to avoid a finding that a ULP has occurred." 4 If the burden
111. Section 10(c) provides in pertinent part, that the board may find a ULP if established
"..
upon the preponderance of the testimony taken. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
112. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
113. FED. R. EVID. 301.

114. Assuming that the employer must come forward with something at the conclusion of the
General Counsel's primafacie case in order to avoid a finding that a ULP has occurred, it is
equally clear that this "something" must be at least sufficient to "meet" the probative value of the
General Counsel's case. If the evidence offered by the employer is less probative than that offered
as part of the General Counsel'sprimafaciecase, then the "preponderance of the testimony" will
require a finding that the Act has been violated. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
At least one commentator appears to have suggested that the employer's obligation to come
forward with "something" at the end of the General Counsel's primafacie case should consist
solely of the obligation to "articulate" some legitimate cause for the contested action, it then being
up to the General Counsel to establish the invalidity of this proferred excuse. See Lederer, sipra
note 36, at 69. This position was taken in reliance upon Furnco v. Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978), McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and related cases arising under Title VII. McDonnell-Douglas, however, should not be relied upon as a model for
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shifted by the Board in Wright Line was intended to be the burden of
persuasion, however, section 10(c) does give rise to a potential complaint requiring further inquiry. A determination must be made, therefore, as5 to which of these burdens the Board referenced in Wright
Line.' 1

formulating rules governing the burdens of proof and production in cases arising under the
NRLA. This conclusion is warranted for two reasons. First, theprimafaciecase required under
McDonnell-Douglasis significantly different from theprimafacie case required by the NLRB and
this difference renders a common form of rebuttal inappropriate. In McDonnell-Douglas, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could make out aprimafacieclaim by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802. Such a showing, the Court held, requires the employer to articulate a legitimate
reason for the action taken, which the plaintiff must prove to be pretextual in order to succeed.
Theprimafacie case required by McDonnell-Douglas does not include any showing of prohibited
motive, of employer desire to disadvantage the protected group. The Supreme Court was apparently influenced by the fact that evidence of such prohibited motive is not easy to come by in race
discrimination cases and it did not wish to bar further inquiry absent such evidence. Given the
relatively "weak" nature of theprimafacie showing required by the Court, however, very little
was required from the responding employer in order to place the onus on the plaintiff to prove the
claim. By contrast, the NLRB has consistently required its General Counsel to offer some evidence of prohibited motive, of employer desire to disadvantage the protected group, as a part of
the primafacie case. The General Counsel must show not only that the alleged discriminatee was
dealt with adversely in some way, but also that: (I) he engaged in union activity, (2) the employer
knew of this activity and (3) the employer harbored animus toward the union. Associated Milk
Producers, 259 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (1982); McCain Foods, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 447, 453 (1978).
When General counsel establishes aprimafacie case, prohibited motive is shown to be present.
The only question remaining is whether it played a sufficient causal role in the action under consideration. Since theprimafacieshowing required of the NLRB's General Counsel is far greater
than that required of Title VII plaintiffs by McDonnell-Douglas,it is clearly appropriate to require
more than simple articulation of a facialiy legitimate motive to overcome thatprimafacie showing.
Use of the McDonnell-Douglas scheme under the NLRA would also pose practical problems.
The General Counsel, unlike Title VII plaintiffs, typically does not have the use of pretrial discovery. If the McDonnell-Douglas approach were used in NRLA cases, the General Counsel would
be required to subpoena extensive data at trial and ferret through it there to determine which
information might provide useful evidence bearing upon the sincerity of the employer's proferred
legitimate motive. It is far more efficient to, at the very least, impose a burden of production upon
the employer to come forward with evidence of past practice or other information helpful in determining whether the employer would have taken the action contested even in the absence of union
activity.
115. It should be noted that the dispute at hand, namely, whether the employer should bear
the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of production under the Wright Line test, affects a
fairly small category of cases. The burden of production requires the employer to offer evidence
meeting or exceeding the probative value of the General Counsel'sprimafaciecase. The burden
of persuasion would require the employer to offer evidence exceeding the General Counsel'sprima
fade case in probative value. The sole area of dispute, therefore, concerns what result should
obtain in situations where the evidence offered by the employer meets the first of those burdens
but not the second, that is, it meets the General Counsel's primafacie case in probative value but
does not exceed it. Obviously, the probative value of evidence cannot be quantified and the trier
of fact must make a somewhat subjective judgment upon characterizing the employer's proof as
sufficient to either meet or exceed the General Counsel's primafacie case. Since this subjective
characterization is within the trier of fact's control, it is unlikely that any difference of formulation
in this area will produce different outcomes. It is more likely to simply produce different explanations supporting the same outcome. Since the topic addressed in the text has been the primary
focus of employer criticism voiced since issuance of Wright Line, however, it is appropriate to
determine whether such criticism identifies legitimate interests which have not been successfully
accommodated in the Wright Line formulation.
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Wright Line itself reflects some degree of confusion on this point. On
the one hand, the Board notes therein that "the shifting of burdens does
not undermine the established concept that the General Counsel must
establish an unfair labor practice by a preponderance of the evidence.""' 6 On the other hand, the decision repeatedly finds that the
"employer has to make the proof" with reference to the second question addressed in the Wright Line test. One aspect of the decision, however, creates the rather clear impression that the burden shifted to the
employer is the burden of proof. The Board states that this shifting
burden "requires the employer to make out what is actually an affirmative defense ...
"17
The Board does not discuss in Wright Line its understanding of the
term "affirmative defense." At common law, the term affirmative defense or "new matter" was used to categorize evidence sufficient to defeat the claim for relief even if all allegations in the complaint were
deemed true. As stated by the California Supreme Court in explicating
this definition:
If the answer, either directly or by necessary implication, admits the
truth of all the essential allegations of the complaint which show a
cause of action, but sets forth facts from which it results that,
notwithstanding the truth of the allegations of the complaint, no
cause of action existed in the plaintiff at the time the action was
brought, those facts are new matter [or an affirmative defense]." 8
An affirmative defense, therefore, does not defeat the essential allegations of the complaint, but rather asserts new facts which preclude relief despite the presumed truth of the complaint. At common law, the
one who pleads an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving it,
not merely the burden of moving forward with evidence concerning
it.1 9 The use of this characterization, therefore, conveys the strong impression that the burden shifted to the employer by the Board in Wright
20
Line is the burden of persuasion.
Is this result consonant with the purposes of the Act? The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the Board's Wright Line decision
116. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088 n.ll.
117. Id
11S. Goddard v. Fulton, 21 Cal. 430, 436 (1863).
119. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §337 (E.W. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
120. This impression is confirmed by Atlas Minerals, a Div. of Atlas Corp., 256 N.L.R.B. No.
22 (1981). In that case, the ALJ found that, "the evidence at this stage of the analysis [the second
question posed in the Wright Line test] does not preponderate in favor of either party" 256
N.L.R.B. at 99. A violation was found on the grounds that the "burden" had shifted to the employer. Quite clearly, the ALJ understood the burden which had shifted to the employer to be the
burden of persuasion, that is, the risk of non-persuasion in the event competing evidence is found
equally probative. The AL's findings and conclusions in this regard were adopted by the Board,
Id at 91, 99.
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upon petition for enforcement and readily concluded that Section 10(c)
precludes construing the burden shifted to the employer under the
Wright Line test as a burden of proof.'2 ' It held that the burden shifted
to the employer should be regarded as solely the burden of production. 122 Close scrutiny establishes that the second question posed in the
Wright Line test cannot be accurately characterized as an affirmative
defense justifying transferance of the burden of persuasion. The second question of the Wright Line test seeks a determination as to
whether the AD was treated any differently than he would have been
had no protected activity taken place. In other words, it seeks a determination as to whether there has been disparate treatment or discrimination. Discrimination, of course, is a necessary element of a section
8(a)(3) violation. This question, therefore, cannot be properly characterized as an affirmative defense, a new fact barring relief even if the
essential elements of the complaint are proven. It concerns an essential
element of the complaint.
By characterizing the second question of the Wright Line test as an
affirmative defense, the Board disclosed a continuing perspective evident in the "in part" test: it suggested that an evil is present as soon as
a desire to retaliate is shown, whether or not that desire to retaliate was
the "but for" cause of the contested action. As has already been discussed, the Board is quite correct in its suspicion that some interest
sought to be served by the Act is in jeopardy if an employer gives expression to such a retaliatory desire. That interest, however, is protected by section 8(a)(1), not section 8(a)(3).1 23 Actual disparity in
treatment is required by section 8(a)(3). Given this fact, Section 10(c)
and long-standing case law 24 preclude the Board from utilizing the
121. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1612
(1982).
122. Id
123. See supra text accompanying notes 99 and 100.
124. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 222 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955). As is noted
above, supra note 110, section 10(c) clearly requires the General Counsel to establish all elements
of an alleged ULP "by the preponderence of the testimony taken." In Wright Line, the Board
sought to partially justify transferring some burden to the employer in reliance upon legislative
history of the "discharge for cause" language added to section 10(c) in 1947. See supra note 109
for a summary of that language. This is a most tenuous basis for transferring the burden of proof
to the employer. The "discharge for cause" language makes no express reference to any burden or
its proper allocation. Given this fact, it should not be regarded as an exception to the general rule
without compelling legislative history. The legislative history offers anything but compelling support for a shifting burden of proof. The version of this amendment which was originally passed
by the House did make express reference to the burden of proof. It barred the Board from reinstatement of an AD ". . . unless the weight of the evidence shows that such individual was not
suspended or discharged for causes." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprintedin 1 LEG. HIST.
31 (1947). This language appeared to place a peculiar burden upon the General Counsel to prove
a negative and it was found objectionable by the Senate. A joint conference produced the current
"discharge for cause" language of section 10(c), which is cast in positive rather than negative
terms and makes no reference to the "weight of the evidence." It simply bars reinstatement of
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affirmative defense label to place the burden of persuasion upon the
employer regarding the second question in the Wright Line test.
The burden of production may and should be shifted to the employer
in connection with that issue. This is not barred by section 10(c); any
other result would be totally illogical and unworkable. Once the General Counsel has established a prima facie case, the employer must
come forward with some response and Wright Line's second question is
the logical topic to address. Moreover, since the topic raised by Wright
Line's second question is the consistent or disparate nature of the action taken, past practice is the focus of attention and such information
is certainly more accessible to the employer than to the General Counsel. Thus, the fairness of assigning the burden of production to the
employer is quite clear. The Board should, therefore, clarify its Wright
Line formula by making evident that the burden shifting to the employer is only the burden of production and that the General Counsel
retains the risk of nonpersuasion should review of the record as a whole
reflect a total balance' 25 of probative evidence introduced in connection with Wright Line's second question.
B.

Uniformity And Elimination Of Confusion

At first blush, Wright Line would appear to have succeeded in producing a uniform system of analysis in dual motive cases which is acceptable to both the Board and the courts of appeals. Wright Line has
been rather warmly received in the courts of appeals. As noted
employees if "discharged for cause." The House Conference Committee report explaining this
revision clearly advised the members of the House that express reference to the General Counsel's

burden of proof was not needed inasmuch as all elements of an alleged ULP must always be

proven by a preponderance of the evidence: "The conference agreement omits the weight of the

evidence language, since the Board, under the general provisions of section 10, must act on a

preponderence of evidence. . ." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80mr CONG., IST SFSs. 55, reprinted in 1

LEG. HIsT. 505 (1947). No one can reasonably suppose that House members reviewing this report
fancied themselves to be adopting a special rule regarding the burden of proof when the amendment was adopted. The Board relied principally on an exchange between Senators Pepper and
Taft which took place on the Senate floor to support a contrary conclusion. That exchange, 93
CONG. REC. 6494, 6518-19, reprintedin 2 LEG. HIsT. 1565, 1593-95 (1947), arose because Senator
Pepper feared any amendment designed to appease the House's desire for inclusion of "discharge

for cause" language in the Act would sanction widespread discharge of union adherents whenever

the employer was capable of articulating some legitimate cause for termination. Senator Taft

sought to allay this fear by repeatedly emphasizing that the conference version was not intended to
bring about any change in current law. In the course of these assurances, Senator Taft made
reference to his understanding of the approach which then prevailed regarding allocation of evidentiary burdens. There is nothing in the colloquy, however, remotely suggesting that the senators gave conscious consideration to the difference between the burden of persuasion and the

burden of production and there is certainly nothing in any senators remarks suggesting that the
language under consideration was viewed as having some adverse impact on employers with reference to either of these burdens. The general nature of the debate establishes that it should not be

relied upon as evidence of Congressional intent to change anything.
125. See supra note 114.
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above, 1 26 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, previously the
Board's strongest critic in connection with dual motive cases, reviewed
Wright Line itself upon petition for enforcement. The First Circuit
quarreled with the Board only insofar as the Board's decision implied
transference of a burden of persuasion to the employer. The court
granted enforcement, however, finding transference of a burden of production to the employer completely proper. 127
For a time it appeared that the First Circuit would stand alone it its
criticism of the Board over the nature of the burden shifted in Wright
Line. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, 28 Fifth,'2 9 Sixth, 130 Sev-

enth' 3 ' and Ninth 132 circuits all readily accepted Wright Line as a concession by the Board to prior appellate criticism 33 without expressly
considering the burden-shifting issue. The Board received "high
marks" for its efforts from these courts of appeals. For example, in
NLRB v. Nevis Indus.,"" the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that:
The new rule strikes an acceptable balance between protection of
employers' rights to discharge
employees' rights and preservation of135
employees for valid business reasons.
In Herman Brothers,Inc. v. NLRB, 136 the employer urged the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit to find that Wright Line improperly
shifts a burden of persuasion to the employer. The Third Circuit considered this argument and pronounced resounding support for the
Board's Wright Line approach. It reviewed its own prior cases regard126. See supra note 120.

127. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899.
128. NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir. 1981).
129. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3933 (1982); NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Associates, 657 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting without analysis an employer objection to the burden-shifting aspect of Wright Line);
NLRB v. Robin Am. Corp., 654 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1981).
130. Borel Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co. of Delaware, 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Allen's I.G.A. Foodliner, 651
F.2d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 651 F.2d 436 (6th Cir.
1981); Charge Card Ass'n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1981). As discussed above, supra note
19, LloydA. Fry stated that the "in part" test is the controlling rule for cases alleging independent
violation of section 8(a)(1) in the Sixth Circuit. It also cites Wright Line, however, without acknowledging any conflict between the two, 651 F.2d at 446.
131. NLRB v. Eldorado Mfg. Corp., 660 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1981); Peavey Co. v.
NLRB, 648 F.2d 460,461 (7th Cir. 1981); Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500,504 (7th Cir.
1981).
132. NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Int'l Medication Systems,
Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1981).
133. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found no necessity to expressly consider
Wright Line's appropriateness to date since it has found the required outcome in those cases
which have come before it quite clear under any of the competing modes of analysis in dual
motive cases. NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
134. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981).
135. Id at 909.
136. 658 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir. 1981).
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ing the appropriate method of analysis in dual motive cases and found
that its own precedent placed the burden of proving a legitimate reason
for contested action to be upon the employer. 137 The court, however,
gave no express consideration to the argument that section 10(c) of the
Act may render this approach defective.
The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits, however,
belatedly elected to give the burden-shifting issue raised in Wright Line
closer scrutiny. In BehringInternationalv. NLRB, t38 the Third Circuit
held that the Board's effort to shift a burden of proof to the employer in
section 8(a)(3) cases runs afoul of section 10(c). The court reasoned
that an illegitimate motive must be shown to have been the "but for"
cause of adverse action before discrimination violative of section
8(a)(3) is established. It concluded that section 10(c) requires the
Board's General Counsel to bear the burden of proving this as well as
all other essential elements of any alleged unfair labor practice. 39 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently agreed.' 40 The
BehringInt'l panel did not acknowledge or discuss the prior decision of
that circuit in Herman Brothers, which seemingly finds the Board's burden-shifting approach consonant with the prior law of that circuit, and
hence the rule prevailing in the Third Circuit is less than clearly
established.
The Ninth Circuit took its turn to review the burden-shifting issue in
Zurn Industries v. NLRB, 141 and upheld the Board's approach. In

Wright Line, the Board defended its burden-shifting approach in partial reliance upon comments of Senator Taft prior to passage of the
"discharge for cause" language added to section 10(c) in 1947.142 Taft
argued in favor of the "discharge for cause" language ultimately passed
on the grounds that it left the burden of proving legitimate cause for
discharge on the employer, where Taft asserted it had been to that date
3
under Board and court decisions.
137. Id at 208.
138. 675 F.2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1982).
139. The court relied upon that portion of section 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), which

provides as follows:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion

that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order
dismissing the said complaint.

The court also noted that the Board's own regulations interpret this provision to mean that "[the
Board's attorney has the burden of proof of violations of section 8 of the National Labor Relations
Act." 29 C.F.R. §101.10(b) (1981).
140. NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1982).
141. 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982).

142. Seesupra notes 109 and 123 and accompanying text for this author's comments regarding
the "discharge for cause" language and the significance of its legislative history.
143. 93 CoNG. REC. 6494, 6518-19 (1947), Reprinted in 2 LEG. HisT. 1565, 1593-95 (1947).
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the First Circuit's Wright Line decision
had found this legislative history "inconclusive." 1

The Zurn Indus-

tries court agreed with this characterization after full discussion of the
pertinent references, but nonetheless reached a contrary holding, stat-

ing that, "[t]his history, although not conclusive, places a sufficient
gloss on section 10(c) to sustain the Board's Wright Line rule. ' 145 The
court found itself obliged to "accept the Board's Wright Line rule if it is

a reasonably defensible interpretation of the Act consistent with its purpose."' 141 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted a similar approach.1 4 7

Increasing polarization of the courts of appeals over this issue ultimately induced the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in NLRB v.

TransportationManagement Corporation,148 a case in which the First
Circuit reiterated its view on the Board's effort to shift a burden of

persuasion to the respondent. Thus, resolution of the Behring International/Zurn Industries controversy can be expected in the foreseeable

future.
Even without resolution of that dispute, however, the fact remains

that Wright Line has gone a long way toward minimizing disputes with
the courts of appeals in those cases which are affected. All courts have
expressed praise for Wright Line's substantive aspects, despite the bur-

den-shifting issue, which has been characterized as a procedural ques144. 680 F.2d at 689.
145. Id at 693.
146. Id at 689 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979) and NLRB v. Local 103
Int'l Ass'n of Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978)). The cases cited by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit support deferral to the Board in cases calling for ".... its special understanding of
the actualities of industrial justice." 441 U.S. at 496. They do not suggest that the Board has any
special expertise in assessing legislative history or rules of evidence which would warrant the
Ninth Circuit's deferral in this instance. One would hope that federal appellate judges could
display equal if not greater skills in these areas. At least one appellate judge has agreed, observing
that, "...one major purpose underlying court review of administrative agency decisions is that of
keeping agency action within statutory bounds laid down by Congress.
...
NLRB v. Transp.
Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130, 133 (Ist Cir.), cert.granted,A-2 DLR No. 220 (BNA) (November 15, 1982) (No. 82-168).
147. NLRB v. Dixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547, 550 and n.4 (8th Cir. 1982).
148. 674 F.2d 130 (1st Cir.)cert.granted,A-2 DLR No. 220 (BNA) (November 15, 1982) (No.
82-168). The Court may also express views impacting upon the burden-shifting aspect of the
Wright Line test upon deciding Connick v. Myers, (5th Cir. July 23, 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3715 (U.S. March 8, 1982) (No. 81-1251), a First Amendment case in which the employer alleged that the plaintiff would have been discharged without regard to any arguably protected activity. The petitioner posed the following as one of the questions presented by the case:
"Does public employer bear burden of proving that employee was in fact fired for other permissible grounds or is he merely responsible for introduction of evidence that articulated permissible
grounds for discharge with employee bearing ultimate burden of proving each element of her case
by preponderance of evidence?" 51 U.S.L.W. 3030 (U.S. August 3, 1982) (No. 81-1251). Questions posed by the Justices during oral argument in this matter, however, indicate that the Court
may not address the burden-shifting issue since the trial court's findings of fact suggest that the
motive for the contested discharge was found without reliance on any notion of shifting burdens
of proof. A-9 DLR No. 218 (BNA) (November 10, 1982) (No. 81-1251).
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tion. Moreover, the courts have generally acknowledged that the
outcome regarding the burden-shifting issue will not affect the end result in many, if any, cases. Ironically, while the Board appears to have
succeeded in eliminating one source of disharmony between itself and
the courts of appeals, it has failed to bring about a uniform system of
analysis within the Board itself on this issue. The major dissension expressed to date regarding Wright Line's usefulness has been expressed
by Board members, not by appellate judges. The controversy which
has arisen revolves around Wright Line's usefulness in section 8(a)(3)
and section 8(a)(1) cases placing motive at issue which cannot properly
be defined as dual motive cases.
In Wright Line itself, the Board majority held that it would prospectively apply the Wright Line test to all section 8(a)(3) and section
8(a)(1) cases requiring a showing of unlawful motivation. 49 The
Board suggested that uniformity should be sought in this area since the
precise test applied in cases apart from dual motive cases should not be
expected to produce any difference in outcome. Member Jenkins issued a separate concurrence in which he expressed some reservations
regarding uniform application of the Wright Line test. 150 Primarily, he
expressed concern regarding cases in which it is difficult to precisely
isolate one cause as the "but for" cause for adverse action. Member
Jenkins suggested that in such a circumstance, ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the General Counsel rather than the employer, since
the employer has "created this situation" in which the precise role of
improper motivation cannot be accurately fixed.' 5' No opinion was expressed in Member Jenkins' separate concurrence as to the appropriateness of utilizing the Wright Line test in those situations which
cannot properly be defined as dual motive cases.
Despite Wright Line's stated intention to avoid future categorization
of section 8(a)(3) and section 8(a)(1) cases requiring a showing of motivation, the Board has subsequently preserved a distinction between
dual motive cases and other such cases. In Concord FurnitureIndustries,Inc.,52 the Board issued a supplemental decision and order which

noted the pretextual nature of the case before it. This was a Pretext I
case. In Quality BroadcastingCorp.,1'53 the Board issued a supplemen-

tal decision and order, again noting the pretextual nature of the case
before it. This was a Pretext II case. In both these cases, however, the
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

251 NLRB at 1089 n.13.
Id at 1091.
Yd
254 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1981).
254 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1981).
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Board explained that its ultimate conclusions would be the same
whether the Wright Line test were utilized or the employer's defenses
54
were simply rejected as pretextual.1
Member Jenkins appeared tolerant of the Board's stated intention to
use Wright Line uniformly until March of 1981, approximately six
months after Wright Line's issuance. In The Bond Press,Inc.,t5 however, the Board's decision included a footnote in which Member Jenkins expressed the view that Wright Line need not be applied in cases
where the employers defenses were rejected as pretextual. 156 Member
Jenkins did not make clear whether this view was held solely with regard to Pretext I cases or both with regard to Pretext I cases and Pretext
II cases. The particular case at hand was a Pretext I case.
Liberty Pavilion Nursing Home,'57 contained the next expression of
Member Jenkins' views in this general area. This was a Single Motive
IG case. The Board's decision included a footnote in which Member
Jenkins observed that application of Wright Line serves no useful purpose where the legitimate motive proffered by the employer is accepted
as the sole cause producing the contested action.' 5 8 Member Jenkins'
views in this area were further made clear in Five Star Air Freight
Corp. ,159 a Pretext II case. Here, for the first time, Member Jenkins
expressed the view that application of the Wright Line test in Pretext II
60
cases serves no useful purpose.1
The increasing appearance of footnotes expressing Member Jenkins'
views in this area began to give the appearance that the Board's effort
to secure uniform analysis in section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) cases
requiring a showing of motivation was suffering gradual erosion. The
Board appeared to temporarily cure this problem in Limestone Apparel
Corp. 161 In Limestone, a Pretext II case, the Board clearly appeared to
hold that Wright Line need not be applied to any cases in which the
employer's defense is rejected as pretextual, whether such case be properly placed in the Pretext I category or the Pretext II category:
[W]e find it unnecessary to formally set forth [the Wright Line] anal154. Concord Furn, 254 N.L.R.B. at 921; Quality Broadcasting, 254 N.L.R.B.
155. 254 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1981).
156. The footnote stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
• . . after all the detailed examination of Respondent's reasons for or defenses of the
discharges, the upshot is that its reasons must be rejected as untrue, and the case is thus
one of 'pretext,' as to which a Wright Line analysis adds nothing.
Id at 1227 n.2.
157. 254 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1981).
158. Id at 1299 n.2.
159. 255 N.L.R.B. 275 (1981).
160. The "legitimate" reasons asserted by the employer in Five Star were found "specious."
Id at 275 n.1.
161. 255 N.L.R.B. 722 (1981).
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ysis in those cases where an administrative law judge's findings and
conclusions fully satisfy the analytical objectives of Wright Line. We
find that such is the case here. Thus, where an administrative law
judge has evaluated the employer's explanation for its action and
concluded that the reasons advanced by the employer were pretextual, that determination constitutes a finding that the reasons advanced by the employer either did not exist or were not in fact relied
upon.
No substantive objective is served by our reiterating and recasting
an administrative law judge's finding and conclusions in order to
achieve formalistic consistency with Wright Line by inserting the
term 'vrimafacie showing" after the evidence which demonstrates
the employer's wrongful motive on the record as a whole and then
stating that "the employer did not meet its burden of demonstrating
that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of
the employee's protected conduct" where the administrative law
judge has concluded that the proffered explanation is pretextual. For
a finding of pretext necessarily means that the reasons advanced by
the employer either did not exist [Pretext I] or were not in fact relied
upon [Pretext II], thereby leaving intact the62inference of wrongful
motive established by the General Counsel.'
The appearance of agreement created by Limestone, however, was
removed only six weeks later by issuance of the Board's decision in
Castle Instant Maintenance/Maid,Inc. 163 In that case, the Board majority made clear that Limestone was not intended to fully adopt Member Jenkins' views in this area. 64 Chairman Fanning and Member
Zimmerman clarified that although they would not insist upon AL use
of Wright Line in pretext cases, they saw no objection to the use of
Wright Line in these cases.' 65 In essence, they expressed the opinion
that in rejecting employers' defenses as pretextual an ALJ may use or
disregard the Wright Line test at their discretion. Since the issuance of
Castle Instant Maintenance, the members of the Board have continued
to express their differing views on use of Wright Line in cases other
than dual motive cases. Footnotes or separate concurring opinions
have been included continuously, although not consistently, in Pretext I
cases, 16 6 Pretext II cases, 167 Single Motive IG cases, 16 and Single Mo162. Limestone Apparel, 255 N.L.R.B. at 722.
163. 256 N.L.R.B. 130 (1981).
164. 256 N.L.R.B. at 130 n.l.
165. Id
166. Compare S.W. Hart & Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 192 (1981) (including footnote expressing
Member Jenkins' view) with St. John's Constr. Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1981) (no reference
included).
167. Compare Union Oil Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1981) (including footnote expressing
Member Jenkins' view) with Quebecor Group, Inc., Philadelphia Journal Div., 258 N.L.R.B. No.
125 (1981) (no reference included).
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tive IB cases1 69 expressing Member Jenkins' view that Wright Line
need not and should not be applied in such circumstances. Indeed,
Member Jenkins has rather vehemently expressed the view that application of Wright Line under these circumstances produces needless po-

tential for confusion.17

Ironically, Member Jenkins has, as yet, not

objected to use of Wright Line in that category of cases where its appli-

cation is least served, namely, Single Motive II cases. By definition, a
Single Motive II case poses no issue of fact as to what event or conduct

precipitated employer action. These cases pose a question of law as to
whether the precipitating event or conduct was activity protected by the
Act. All of the Single Motive II cases included in this study were reviewed because either the ALJ or the Board made reference to and use
of Wright Line in those cases. This use, however, clearly served no

purpose.
Should any portion of Member Jenkins' views be adopted by the

Board in order to better serve its effort to bring about agreement on the
analysis to be used in section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) cases requiring

a demonstration of motive? Adoption of Member Jenkins' views in
connection with Pretext I and Pretext II cases would likely bring about
agreement within the Board and the courts of appeals. As noted
above, 17 1 the courts of appeals are not in agreement with the Board's
conclusion that the employer's defense may be rejected as pretextual in

both Pretext I and Pretext II cases. If the Board were to cease using
Wright Line in Pretext II cases, the courts of appeals would likely re-

gard this as an effort to circumvent Wright Line and the disarray which
preceded Wright Line would likely be resurrected.

72

Adoption of

168. Compare Gerson Elec. Constr. Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1981) (including footnote expressing Member Jenkins' view) with Cato Oil & Grease Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 153 (1981) (no
reference included).
169. Compare Cal-Walts, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1981) (including footnote expressing
Member Jenkins' view) with King Trucking Co., 259 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1981) (no reference
included).
170. See, e.g., Blackstone Co., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1981) (Member Jenkins dissenting, in
part).
171. See supra note 57.
172. Only one appellate decision rendered to date expresses a view supporting a conclusion
contrary to that asserted in the text. In NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir.
1981), Circuit Judge Newman issued a separate concurring opinion in which he expressed a preference for analysis of pretext cases without use of the Wright Line test. Judge Newman noted that
the second question posed by the Wright Line test necessarily initiates a speculative inquiry: What
would the employer have done in the absence of any protected activity? In Judge Newman's
opinion, however, an effort to determine whether an employer's asserted legitimate cause for action is true or pretextual initiates an inquiry into the facts as they did evolve, rather than as they
might have evolved absent protected activity. 646 F.2d at 43. Judge Newman's observations appear analytically sound. Little practical impact can be expected, however, whether the Board asks
the question, "What would the employer have done in the absence of protected activity?" as suggested by Wright Line or the question, "Did the employer really rely on the asserted legitimate
cause?" as suggested by Judge Newman. In either case, the same factors (evidence of consistent or
disparate treatment, presence or absence of evidence reflecting surveillance of the AD, presence or
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Member Jenkins' view in connection with Pretext I and Pretext II cases,
therefore, would not appear prudent.
It does appear prudent, however, to adopt Member Jenkins' view in
connection with Single Motive IG cases, Single Motive IB cases and
particularly Single Motive II cases, despite the fact that Member Jenkins himself has not to date expressed objection to use of Wright Line
with reference to this last category. In cases where there is no necessity
whatsoever to weigh competing, credible evidence of motive, Wright
Line serves no purpose and Member Jenkins' fear that it produces confusion may well be valid. In the interest of minimizing dissension,
therefore, the Board should make clear that the Wright Line test need
not and should not be utilized in Single Motive IG cases, Single Motive
IB cases and Single Motive II cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

Upon adopting the Mount Healthy formula for resolving dual motive
cases the Board asked itself, "How can friction with the courts of appeals in this area be eliminated?" Wright Line has proved a satisfactory answer to that question. In order to satisfactorily protect the
interests sought to be served by the Act, however, the Board should
have investigated different questions before tackling the goal of uniformity. Most importantly, it should have inquired as to precisely what
legitimate interest[s] the Board's prior "in part" test sought to serve. It
further should have asked how much legitimate interests could be protected while striving toward uniformity.
As discussed above, the Board's failure to explore these questions
and provide more clear guidance in this area of the law has produced
certain undesirable effects. Those effects can be cured and the use of
the Wright Line formula can be otherwise improved if the following
actions are taken:
(1) The board should stand ready to find violations of section
8(a)(1) where an employer's comments or conduct suggests to employees that an AD has in fact been selected for discipline because of protected activities. The Board should further give careful consideration
in such cases to whether traditional section 8(a)(1) remedies such as
notice posting will satisfactorily remedy any coercive effect which has
been experienced by the workforce or whether more significant remedial action such as reinstatement should be required. The General
absence of evidence reflecting animus, timing, consistency or inconsistency of the employer's various statements of position, presence or absence of admissions and the possibility of condonation)
will be relied upon to supply the answer to the question posed.
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Counsel should, of course, be attentive to these areas in determining

is warranted in cases where adverse emwhether issuance of complaint
173
ployer action is challenged.
(2) The Board should make clear that the burden shifted to the employer as part of the Wright Line test is solely a burden of production.
Characterization of the second question posed within the Wright Line

test as an "affirmative defense" should be expressly abandoned.
(3) The Board should make clear that Wright Line need not and
should not be applied in Single Motive IG cases, Single Motive IB
cases and Single Motive II cases, as defined in this article.
Adoption of the foregoing recommendations can be expected to pro-

duce greater uniformity with greater accommodation of interests
sought to be served by the Act than is accomplished under the Wright
Line test as it has been applied to date.

173. The observations made in this article regarding Wright Line's deficiencies might be relied
upon to support a more pervasive criticism of that test than suggested by the recommendation in
the text. It could be argued that failure to fully analyze the differing requirements of and interests
sought to be protected by section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) caused the Board to improperly adopt
the same test for determining motive for use in both types of cases. Wright Line's "but for" approach appears consistent with the General Counsel's obligation to prove discrimination, that is,
different treatment than otherwise would have ensued in a section 8(a)(3) case. It would appear
less justifiable in section 8(a)(1) cases, where the central inquiry should be "whether the employer
engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights under the Act." Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 NLRB 502, 503 n.2 (1965). The
bad example created by the four cases made the focus of this article establishes that interference
with employee rights may be accomplished even where protected activity is not a "but for" cause
of disciplinary action. Given this phenomenon, justification may exist for retaining the "in part"
test in independent section 8(a)(l) cases placing motive at issue although abandoning it in section
8(a)(3) cases. In other words, a reasoned basis exists for the approach which has evolved in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, even though the
court has never articulated it. This approach is not recommended here for two reasons. First, the
focus in determining whether a disciplinary action or its surrounding circumstances violates section 8(a)(1) should not be whether an illegitimate motive was present, but the degree to which this
motive has been communicated in a manner likely to coerce the exercise of future rights. The
method of analysis recommended in the text places the focus on communication of the illegitimate
motive and is, therefore, preferable to use of the "in part" test in independent section 8(a)(1) cases.
Secondly, the recommendations stated in the text have been designed to correct deficiencies in the
Wright Line framework without requiring direct reversal of the Board's current policies in any
significant respects. Given the confused history of the law in this area, another about-face seems
worth avoiding if such can be accomplished while better accommodating litigants' legitimate
interests.
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